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Natural Gas and Electric Utility Rate
Reform: Taxation Through Ratemaking?
By ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.*
GLEN S. HOWARD**
I. Introduction
Electric and gas utility rates have risen dramatically in recent
years. It has become almost an annual event that these utilities an-
nounce their intention to seek additional rate increases of greater and
greater magnitude.' These increases are occurring at a time when con-
sumers are acutely aware of the limits of our energy resources. The
combination of rising prices and decreasing resources has resulted in
a variety of rate reform proposals, many of which advocate changes de-
viating significantly from traditional ratemaking approaches.
Historically, ratemaking has been synonymous with determining a
utility's total average cost of service, including a reasonable rate of re-
turn on rate base, and matching these costs to the consumers who im-
pose them. To determine these costs, regulatory commissions usually
select a recent and presumably representative year of a utility's oper-
ations and compute the total costs incurred by the utility during that
year in rendering the regulated service.2 These costs are said to consti-
* A.B., 1967, University of Rochester; J.D., 1970, University of Chicago.
Member, Georgia and District of Columbia Bars.
** A.B., 1971, Harvard University; J.D., 1974, University of Chicago. Member,
Georgia and District of Columbia Bars.
1. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, NATURAL GAS ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1976, S. REP. No. 94-907, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976). Huntington, The Rapid
Emergence of Marginal Cost Pricing In the Regulation of Electric Utility Rate Struc-
tures, 55 B.U.L. REV. 689, 690-96 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Huntington]; Samuelson,
Battle Lines Are Being Generated for Reform of Electric Utility Rates, 8 NAT'L J. 1474
(1976) (average residential electric rates alone rose 54% between 1969 and 1975 with
the average residential bill increasing 91 % due to increased consumption); BUSINESS
WEEK, Nov. 29, 1976, at 55 (total electricity rates have risen 75% since 1969).
2. Traditionally, these costs have represented the utility's historic or embedded
costs based on the previous year. Recently, however, commissions have frequently re-
quired that estimates for a future test period be included. See, e.g., Georgia Power Co.,
tute the company's "test year cost of service" and, in addition to a rea-
sonable rate of return on rate base, form the company's revenue re-
quirement.
Since utility revenue requirements are assessed on total average
costs, utility rate structures traditionally are designed on the basis of
average cost principles as well. Average cost rate structures, properly
devised, seek to allocate the utility's revenue requirement so that the
prices charged to consumers for services reflect only the actual costs
the utility has incurred in providing those services. Such an approach
would eliminate subsidization among customer classes and customers
within a class by ensuring that all customers pay their own way. In
so doing, a utility would recover its full costs-no more and no less. 4
9 P.U.R.4th 381 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975) (twelve months estimated); Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co., No. 6985 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Dec. 9, 1976) (five months esti-
mated, seven months actual).
The Federal Power Commission requires electrical utilities to file a cost of service
for both the most recent twelve month period for which actual data is available and also
an estimated cost of service for the twelve month period immediately succeeding the date
on which the new schedule is to become effective. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.13(b)(1); Public
Serv. Co. of Ind., No. 783, at 14-19 (FPC, Nov. 10, 1976); American Pub. Power Ass'n
v. FPC, 522 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
3. In general, state public service commissions regulate the profits of public util-
ity corporations pursuant to statutory and sometimes constitutional guidelines. Most
commissions are entrusted with the duty of setting "just and reasonable" rates. Such
rates are to produce revenue equal to a utility's total cost of service including a reason-
able rate of return on rate base. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 78, §§ 68-69 (1975
& Supp. 1976); Ga. Const. § 2-2401, GA. CODE ANN. § 93-309. Once the commission
has determined what the company's overall revenue requirement shall be, the company
then submits a schedule of rates designed to generate this amount of revenue in a man-
ner which avoids "undue discrimination." These rate schedules or tariffs constitute pub-
lic notice of the price that will be charged for the service of the utility. They usually are
divided among at least three primary classes of retail customers: residential, commercial,
and industrial. The relationship among the rate schedules for these various classes of
customers and the amounts of revenue they produce is what is meant by the term "rate
structure." The relationship of these rates within each class of customers often is re-
ferred to as "rate design." For a comprehensive discussion of the ratemaking process,
see J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961) [hereinafter cited as
BONBRIGHT]; 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITU-
TIONS (1970) [hereinafter cited as KAHN]; 2 id. 1971); A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION (1969) [hereinafter cited as PRIEST]. See also Huntington, supra
note 1, at 698-718; Jones, Judicial Determination of Public Utility Rates: A Critique,
54 B.U.L. REv. 873, 874-94 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Jones].
4. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners has noted:
"Electric rates should be based on the cost of service, and it is generally cheaper to
serve larger customers than smaller customers. Cost of service rates are deemed gen-
erally to discourage the wasteful use of electricity, for they allocate to each customer
the proper costs associated with his consumption of electricity. When rates are not
based on the cost of service, some customers receive subsidized electricity at a price
which is below the cost of production at the expense of others who pay a penalty."
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Many of the reforms proposed today, both in the gas and electric
utility industries, challenge these traditional ratemaking goals. Some
reforms begin with the premise that the relevant costs for fixing rates
are not the utility's average costs, but its marginal or long run incre-
mental costs. Others, such as some versions of lifeline rates, reject out-
right the traditional notion that rates should be cost based for all con-
sumers. These reforms illustrate a change in perspective, or at least
in emphasis, as to what a rate is, what it should accomplish, and what
the overall scope of the ratemaking process is or should be. For most
reformers, rates constitute more than a just and reasonable quid pro
quo for a utility's services: they are a social or economic tool which
may, for example, promote conservation of gas or electricity, allocate
decreasing gas supplies among competing consumers, lower peak de-
mand for electricity, or provide relief for low income consumers. The
end result of such a view is to broaden considerably the overall scope
of the ratemaking process. 5
Though most reform proposals purport to be cost based, imple-
menting them usually results in wide deviations from whatever cost
standard is employed. To the extent rates significantly depart from
cost as the basic touchstone by which they are set, the ratemaking pro-
cess becomes even more politicized and indeed, akin to taxation.6
As a result, rates paid by some consumers will be greater than the
cost to the utility of providing service to them, while rates paid by
other consumers will be substantially less than the utility's cost of pro-
viding that service. The determination of who subsidizes whom will
in turn depend, to a large extent, on the political judgment (and per-
haps the political aspirations) of regulators as well as the particular
policy goals certain pricing techniques purport to encourage and
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, 1974 REPORT OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL ON ECONOMICS 13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NARUC REPORT].
See generally R. CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMICS 146-72 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as CAYWOOD].
It must be noted, however, that, as one commentator has stated, "the allocation of
costs for purposes of rate design is both controversial and complex." Jones, supra note
3, at 889-90. Similarly, Professor Bonbright has observed hat "the most that can be
hoped for is the development of techniques of cost allocation that reflect only the major,
more stable, and more predictable cost relationships." BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 297.
5. See generally Cicchetti, Electricity Price Regulation: Critical Crossroads or
New Group Participation Sport, PUB. UTILs. FORTNIGHTLY, Aug. 29, 1974, at 13.
6. This is not to suggest that consumer groups with various points of view should
not participate in the rate making process; however, without definable ratemaking stand-
ards of rate formulation, there will be no relatively objective way of reconciling the vari-
ous components of the "public interest" represented by these groups.
regulators seek to advance. Such reforms thus constitute a form of tax-
ation through ratemaking that leads to significant income redistribution
among and within customer classes and may provide regulatory com-
missioners with virtually untrammeled discretion.
This article will examine some of the gas and electric utility re-
forms advocated today, with primary emphasis on those which deviate
most sharply from traditional ratemaking approaches. The effective-
ness of these reforms will be analyzed in terms of their expressed goals
and the economic and legal consequences that are likely to result if they
are implemented.
II. Electric Utility Rate Structure Reforms
Electric utility rate reform has recently received a great deal of
attention.7  Various state commissions have conducted or are in the
process of conducting generic rate design hearings focusing on the ade-
quacy of the present rate structures of local utilities and a wide variety
of proposed alternatives." Though retail electric utility rates tradition-
ally have fallen within the exclusive domain of state regulatory com-
missions, some state legislatures and even Congress have recently taken
7. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, NATURAL GAS ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1976, S. REP. No. 94-907, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976); Huntington, supra note 1;
Samuelson, Battle Lines Are Being Generated for Reform of Electric Utility Rates, 8
NAT'L J. 1474 (1976). The primary catalyst for this attention has been rising electricity
rates. Inflation, the rising costs of capital, fuel, labor, property taxes, and the like have
contributed significantly to these rising rates. In addition, during these times of rising
costs, the construction of new plants necessary to meet increasing peak demand for elec-
tricity as well as construction necessary to replace obsolete facilities also has contributed
to both the frequency and the magnitude of electric utility rate increases. Furthermore,
total capital requirements are expected to continue to spiral upward. The Federal
Energy Administration, for instance, has estimated that yearly capital costs for the in-
dustry during the decade 1975-1985 will be three times the comparable costs in 1970.
Myhra, The E-l-a-s-t-i-c-i-t-y Argument in Electricity Demand, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY,
Jan. 6, 1974, at 41-42; Willrich, The Electric Utility and the Energy Crisis, Part 1, PUB.
UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 2, 1975, at 22, 25.
8. Generic rate design hearings have recently been completed and opinions ren-
dered in California, Maryland, and New York. No. 9804 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
Mar. 16, 1976); No. 6808 (Md. Pub. Serve. Comm'n, Mar. 18, 1977); Rate Design for
Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R. 4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976). A hearing has been
held and a final decision is pending in Connecticut. Initial Findings, New Pricing Prin-
ciples and Rate Structures for Electric and Gas Companies No. 760204 (Nov. 30, 1976).
In addition, the West Virginia Public Service Commission has submitted a report to the
legislature analyzing various electric utility reforms. DIVISION OF ACCOUNTS, FINANCE
& RATES, W. VA. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, SYSTEMS AND POLICIES FOR THE PRICING OF ELEC-
TRICAL POWER IN WEST VIRGINIA, FIRST REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1975)
[hereinafter cited as W. VA. REPORT].
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an active interest in this area. Numerous bills have been proposed
dealing with various electric utility rate reforms.9
Most of the electric rate reforms currently advocated, either in
legislatures or before commissions, attempt to accomplish one or more
of the following objectives: overall reduction of the cost of electricity,
reduction of the capital investment of electric utilities necessary to meet
increases in peak demand, and promotion of energy conservation. In
addition, some proposals have specific social welfare objectives as their
primary goal. This section will analyze several of these reforms-spe-
cifically, marginal cost pricing, and inverted, flat, and lifeline rates.
A. Marginal Cost Pricing
Rates based on marginal cost attempt to reflect a utility's incre-
mental (or decremental) cost of providing one more (or one less) unit
of electricity at a given point in time.' 0 Such rates usually are com-
bined with peak load pricing in the form of time of day and seasonal
rates." They attempt to reflect the difference in marginal cost to the
utility of producing (or not producing) electricity at peak and off-peak
9. See, e.g., H.R. 12461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3310, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976). These bills, inter alia, would establish minimum national standards for
electric rate making which provide for lifeline rates and for consideration by state com-
missions of such other load management techniques as time of day peak load pricing
techniques based on marginal cost principles. See generally STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM.
ON ENERGY AND POWa OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, ELEC-
TRIC UTILITY RATE REFORM AND REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976). See also S. 1666, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2502, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); S. 2747, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 3011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
See generally Hearings on S.1666, S.2208, S.2502, S. 2747, S. 3011, S. 3310 and S. 3311
Before the Senate Comm. On Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
In addition, Title II of S. 2747, the Electrical Utility Rate and Structural Reform
Act of 1975, required the FEA to submit to Congress a report by June 1976 analyzing
various electric utility rate reforms. Similar legislation has been introduced, and in some
instances enacted, by various states. North Carolina, for instance, enacted a statute in
1975 requiring its Public Utilities Commission to study peak load pricing and to examine
various load management techniques. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-155(d) (Supp. 1975). See
also MD. CODE ANN. art. 78, § 54E (Supp. 1976) (requires Public Service Commission
to recommend rates that will encourage conservation). Several bills were introduced,
but not enacted, in Maryland to establish peak period pricing or lifeline rates. See, e.g.,
H.B. 219; H.B. 735; H.B. 1017.
10. See No. 6808 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976) (testimony of David H. Helsby,
at 9-10); BONBRIOHT, supra note 4, at 317-36; KAHN, supra note 3, at 63.
11. Peak load pricing refers to the general concept of pricing electric service to
reflect the higher cost of providing service during the utility's peak load periods. Sea-
sonal pricing refers to the concept of pricing electric service to reflect the varying costs
of providing service at different times during the year and time of day pricing reflects
the varying costs of providing service at different times during the day.
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times during the day and year. This approach thus provides an incen-
tive which, it is hoped, will encourage a shift from peak to off-peak
usage.
The implementation of time of day pricing, seasonal differentials,
and other peak load pricing devices is, however, not at all dependent
upon marginal cost pricing theory.12 Such devices also may be em-
ployed using average cost as the basis upon which rates are set. It may
be argued that the differential between peak and off-peak rates that
results from an average cost approach is not as great as the differential
based on marginal cost, thus creating less of an incentive to shift use
from peak to off-peak periods. Such considerations, however, depend
primarily upon the demand elasticity of the consumers involved, not the
particular cost philosophy used to develop the rates. 3 This section,
therefore, focuses on the legal and economic consequences of attempt-
ing to apply marginal cost pricing theory to the electric utility industry,
rather than the potential benefits that may result if peak load pricing
is implemented.
There are enormous definitional problems in determining what is
and what is not a marginal cost.' 4 The definition varies with, among
12. As one commentator has noted, "Peak-load pricing policies are in fact fol-
lowed in jurisdictions using traditional average cost regulation. The method of costing
is therefore basically irrelevant to the decision whether it is possible or desirable to
charge more for peak usage than for off-peak usage and to adopt time-of-day and sea-
sonal rates. Accordingly one may reject marginal cost pricing as a general method of
regulation and still favor peak-load pricing and be perfectly consistent in doing so."
Morton, Long-run Incremental Costs and the Pricing of Electricity, Part 1, PuB. UriLS.
FORTNIGHTLY, Mar. 11, 1976, at 35. See also Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R.
4th 434, 440 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976). The commission cited testimony in the
case to the effect that: "[tihe application of marginal cost pricing principles to electric
rates would require peak-load pricing, since the cost of supplying additional consumption
ordinarily varies (whether little or much need not concern us at this point) by the time
of day and season of the year. If we adopt the former, we must be prepared to adopt
the latter. The converse, however, is not true: The case for rates varying with time
of consumption is not dependent on the case for marginal cost pricing; it is possible to
justify and base time-related rates on average costs, embedded costs, fully allocated costs,
as well as marginal." Id. at 440 (testimony of Dr. Paul Joskow).
13. For a discussion of peak load pricing, see Grainger, A Practical Approach to
Peak-Load Pricing, PuB. UTILs. FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 9, 1976, at 19; Teed, A Practitioner
Looks at Peak-Load Pricing, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 29, 1976, at 26; Wenders,
The Misapplication of the Theory of Peak-Load Pricing to the Electric Utility Industry,
PUB. UTILs. FORTNIGHTLY, Dec. 4, 1975, at 22. See also Huntington, supra note 1, at
723-25; Note, Lexonomics and the Electrical Utility Industry: In Search of the Optimal
Rate Structure, 61 IowA L. REV. 134, 165-80 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lexonomics].
14. See, e.g., Melody, The Marginal Utility of Marginal Analysis in Public Policy
Formulation, 8 J. ECON. ISSUES 287, 294 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Melody]. The
author notes that, despite resort to definitional aids such as shortrun and longrun mar-
ginal costs by adherents of marginal cost pricing theory, "[tihe term marginal cost is
[Vol. 281090
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various factors, the time frame which is used to calculate marginal
cost. 5 A rate developed on the basis of shortrun marginal costs as-
sumes that the marginal unit of electricity is produced without any ad-
ditions to existing plant and equipment. Thus, shortrun marginal costs
tend to be volatile and often fluctuate dramatically depending upon the
relationship of current consumption to current plant capacity. More-
over, such costs give no indication either to consumers or to utilities
of what future electricity costs are likely to be. Longrun marginal
costs, on the other hand, are relatively more stable and take into ac-
count the need for new capacity. These costs usually are calculated
by determining the rate of increased output over a span of several years
so general that the variety of interpretations of its meaning is virtually infinite....
The important issue in marginal analysis is always the selection of the alternative
courses of action between which the marginal conditions will be measured.
"One is reminded of the story of the young man who told his father that he had
walked home from school instead of taking the bus and saved $.25. The father replied
that his son should have walked home instead of taking a taxi because then he would
have saved $3.00. . . . Had the son evaluated the alternatives of taking the bus home
instead of a taxi, he would have concluded that the marginal cost of taking a taxi was
not $3.00, but $2.75. If he considered a limousine ride at $5.00, he would have con-
cluded that the marginal cost relative to walking was $5.00; the marginal cost relative
to taking the bus was $4.75; and the marginal cost relative to taking a taxi was $2.00.
The marginal cost depends crucially on the relevant decision alternative that will not
be followed. He who selects this decision alternative will determine the marginal cost.
Clearly, public policies affecting vested interests cannot be based upon such subjective
assessments by vested interests." Id. (emphasis in original). See also No. 6808 (Md.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 9, 1976) (testimony of James Lim). Mr. Lim described
the difficulty of determining what costs to include in calculating a marginal price. Be-
cause long term additions are instituted under different assumptions than intermediate
or short term additions, and because construction occurs in irregular and often overlap-
ping time frames, selection of the appropriate costs for "marginal" capacity costs are
unclear. Allocation of other costs is similarly unclear. Mr. Lim testified, "Aside from
production fuel-related costs, what are the marginal costs of operating and maintenance,
labor, materials and supplies, customer accounting, administrative and general expenses,
taxes, etc.? Should they be ignored or is a projected unit cost appropriate? If the latter,
on what should such a projection be based? Do we go back to average costs to estimate
marginal costs.
"The problem of correctly determining marginal costs is somewhat akin to serving
a growing line of patrons from a continuously cooking stew pot to which new ingredients
are constantly being added. If patrons pay in advance and inflation keeps raising the
price of the ingredients being added, doubts arise as to how each patron gets what he
paid for. The resulting mix becomes very difficult to distinguish in deciding which of
the new ingredients should be assigned to new consumers when the service is being dis-
pensed on a uniform basis from a common source." Id. at 38. But see No. 26806 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, June 30, 1975) (testimony of Charles H. Frazier), summarized in
National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Current Issues In Electric Utility
Rate Setting, at A-60 to A-66, Apr. 13, 1976; Kahn, Economic Theory as a Guideline
for Government Intervention and Control; 8 J. EcoN. ISSUES 303, 305-07 (1974).
15. See Huntington, supra note 1, at 719-22; KAHN, supra note 3, at 70-83.
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in the future. 16  Because this approach results in rates which take into
account a utility's future plans, most advocates of marginal cost pricing
prefer to use a longrun standard.' 7 For practical and theoretical rea-
sons, this results in an estimate of longrun incremental cost rather than
longrun marginal cost.' 8
Regardless of the time frame used to calculate the relevant mar-
ginal costs, the theoretical basis for implementing marginal cost rates
remains the same: rates equal to marginal cost maximize efficiency and
result in an optimal allocation of society's scarce resources. 9 As one
commentator has explained:
If consumers are to make the choices that will yield them the
greatest possible satisfaction from society's limited aggregate pro-
ductive capacity, the prices that they pay for the various goods and
services available to them must accurately reflect their respective
opportunity costs; only then will buyers be judging, in deciding
what to buy and what not, whether the satisfaction they get from
the purchase of any particular product is worth the sacrifice of
other goods and services that its production entails. If their judg-
ments are correctly informed in this way, they will, by their inde-
pendent purchase decisions, guide our scarce resources into those
lines of production that yield more satisfaction than all available
alternatives-which means that total satisfaction will be maxi-
mized.20
16. See Huntington, supra note 1, at 721.
17. See KAHN, supra note 3, at 83-86.
18. As one commentator has noted, "Strictly defined, LRMC [long-run marginal
cost] is the cost of an additional single unit of capacity. Obviously, electric utilities
add capacity in large chunks and there is no meaningful measure of the cost of a single
unit. Accordingly, the concept of long-run incremental cost (LRIC) was developed as
a surrogate or approximation of long-run marginal cost. Roughly speaking, long-run in-
cremental cost is computed on the basis of increments of the size that the utility would
normally plan. L. FLAX & M. DRAZEN, CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE DE-
SIGN OF ELECTRIC UTILITY RATES 56 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FLAX & DRAZEN].
See also Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R. 4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976) (testimony of Dr. William H. Melody), reprinted in NATIONAL CONSUMER INFOR-
MATION CENTER, HANDBOOK FOR CONSUMER ADvOCATES: ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE PRO-
CEEDINGS 393 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. Dr. Melody argues that longrun
incremental cost when defined as "a selected average unit cost of the capacity and output
that a utility plans to add over -the next decade or so" is not an appropriate marginal
cost according to the criteria of economic theory. Id.
19. Utility rate structures traditionally have had three primary objectives: the col-
lection of the utility's revenue requirement, the fair apportionment of a utility's costs
among and within its various customer classes, and the promotion of economic effi-
ciency. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 291-93; PRIEST, supra note 3, at 329. Marginal
cost pricing focuses on the third objective-economic efficiency-and pays little or no
attention to the first two. Indeed, most marginal cost proponents believe that the rev-
enue requirement is taken care of by certain adjustments to marginal cost rates, and that
fairness is synonymous with economically efficient rates. See note 27 & accompanying
text infra.
20. KAHN, supra note 3, at 66.
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Marginal cost pricing theory has long been accepted by most eco-
nomists; 2' however, its general application in the "real world" and, spe-
cifically, to the electric utility industry requires so many compromises
of the underlying theory that it is difficult to discern what, if any, advan-
tages are to be gained by implementation of this approach. Assuming
for the sake of argument that marginal costs can and have been ade-
quately defined and measured,22 certain assumptions must be made
concerning the economy in general. For example, marginal cost
pricing produces an optimal allocation of resources only if all goods in
the economy are priced at their marginal cost. This gives rise to what
has been called the "problem of the second best" which, as one com-
mentator has noted,
is obviously a very serious one in an economy shot through with
imperfections of competition, monopoly power, and government
taxes and subsidies, causing all prices to diverge in varying direc-
tions and degrees from marginal costs.2 3
In addition, such an approach assumes perfect knowledge on the part
of all consumers and accepts as optimal the particular income distri-
bution that results when all goods are priced at their marginal cost.24
Quite apart from the compromises necessitated by pervasive im-
perfections in the economy in general, the legal framework within which
utilities must operate necessitates a further compromise: given the fact
that, by statute, utilities can recover only their actual cost of service,
21. See, e.g., Rate Design for EIec. Corp., 15 P.U.R.4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976). The opinion quotes Dr. Paul Joskow as follows: "There is, I submit,
no real argument about whether marginal cost pricing is right or wrong. If our goal
is economic efficiency, it is almost definitional that the prices of commodities must re-
flect the marginal social cost of supplying these commodities." Id. at 440.
22. Just what is and what is not a marginal cost is exceedingly difficult to deter-
mine. Resolving such problems substantively broadens the scope of regulators' discre-
tion. One authority has said, "In the final analysis, it must be recognized that marginal
costs (as well as revenues) are entirely bound up on the personal judgment of the an-
alyst, the 'arbitrary' decisions that he makes in defining his problems, and his changing
expectations." Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R.4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976) (testimony of Dr. William H. Melody), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra
note 18, at 406. But see Current Issues In Electric Utility Rate Setting, at A-80 to A-
83, Apr. 13, 1976 (testimony of Sally Streiter).
23. KAHN, supra note 3, at 69. Professor Kahn, however, goes on to conclude:
"In the author's view in principle it does not make solution impossible in specific situa-
tions, nor does it make it practically impossible in such instances to make the type of
informed piecemeal decisions policymakers must inevitably make about how far and in
what directions to qualify the basic rule of marginal-cost pricing." Id. at 70. But see
Melody, supra note 14, at 297; Melody, Interservice Subsidy: Regulatory Standards and
Applied Economics, in ESSAYS ON PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND REGULATION 167, 182-
83 (H. Trebling ed. 1971).
24. See KAHN, supra note 3, at 70.
including a reasonable return on rate base,25 it simply is not possible
to establish a rate structure that charges each consumer a rate equal
to marginal cost. The following example illustrates why this is so.
In the operation of an electric system, a utility tries to minimize
its costs. This is done by operating its lowest cost generation units first
and then, step-by-step, adding higher cost units as system requirements
dictate. At any given moment, a large part of the energy production
is from relatively efficient base load units with low overall costs,
another portion is from intermediate units with somewhat higher over-
all costs and another component is from peaking units with the highest
overall costs. As many commentators have noted, under today's con-
ditions of rising costs, marginal costs are usually above average costs.
Thus, the marginal cost of producing a kilowatt hour at peak periods
during the day, for example, may be five cents due to the fact that high
cost peaking units are employed; but the average cost may be only two
cents per kilowatt hour because the cost of these units must be aver-
aged with lower cost base load generators and intermediate units. 26
A customer who is being served during any given hour is using
not only marginal kilowatt hours but a mix of all of the kilowatt hours
produced on the system at that hour. Thus, the utility's actual cost of
producing electricity is the average cost of serving that customer rather
than the marginal cost; however, if a customer is charged the marginal
cost of five cents per kilowatt hour for all kilowatt hours consumed
during the peak period of the day, rather than the average cost of two
cents per kilowatt hour, the consumer pays three cents more than the
utility's cost of service. The total revenue collected by such rates would
thus be substantially above the actual costs incurred by the utility. And
indeed, the initial rate, prior to any adjustment, would be above the
"just and reasonable" rate that would be charged in collecting the
actual costs incurred by the utility, plus a reasonable rate of return.
Alternatively, if the marginal cost rate is below average cost, the rate
set would be below the just and reasonable standard, would result in an
undercollection of revenue, and, in effect, would constitute a confis-
catory rate.
Various adjustments have been proposed to make the revenue col-
lected by marginal cost rates conform to the utility's revenue require-
25. See, e.g., MD. CoDa ANN., art. 78, §§ 28, 68, 69 (1975 & Supp. 1976).
26. See, e.g., Morton, Long-Run Incremental Costs and the Pricing of Electricity,
Part 1, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Mar. 11, 1976, at 34. Though the example in the
text is based only on marginal generation costs, it is likely that even with the inclusion of
transmission and distribution costs, marginal costs would still exceed average costs.
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ment.27  The rates which result after these adjustments have been
made, however, deviate considerably from marginal cost. Indeed,
there is little to suggest that such compromised "marginal cost" rates
allocate resources any better than average cost rates.28 Moreover, the
various methods of making these necessary adjustments introduce addi-
tional difficulties. As one commentator has stated, or perhaps under-
stated: "The question how these adjustments should be made presents
one of the most intriguing challenges to advocates of marginal cost
pricing. "29
1. Adjustments to Marginal Cost Rates
The most direct approach to the "excess-deficit revenue" problem
created by marginal cost rates is simply to provide a direct subsidy to
the utility in the event of a revenue deficit or to tax away the surplus
in the event of an excess. This approach, however, has been rejected
primarily because the power to levy a tax or to allocate funds from the
state's general fund is clearly beyond the powers of state regulatory
commissions.10 In addition, as Professor Bonbright has explained:
[Q]uite aside from ...considerations of income-distributive jus-
tice, there are serious political objections to wholesale extensions
of public subsidies: namely, that legislative grants of subsidies
come so largely through the efforts of pressure groups and of re-
gional interests which are under little impulse to weigh the benefits
to themselves against the costs to other people.
3
.
Similar problems result from the application of other commonly pro-
posed adjustments to marginal cost rates. As will be shown below,
common proposals such as inframarginal and inverse elasticity of de-
mand adjustments, in practical effect, also result in a form of taxation
for some consumers, significantly redistribute income within and among
customer classes, and raise serious questions of legal and economic dis-
crimination.
27. See, e.g., Case No. 6808 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 9, 1976) (testimony
of Dr. John Boland). For a discussion of various such adjustments, See Huntington,
supra note 1, at 738-46; Lexonomics, supra note 13, at 157; Comment, Reform of Elec-
tricity Pricing in The United States, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 183, 202-03 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Reform of Electricity Pricing].
28. See Proposed Order of Hearing Examiner, No. 6808, at 13-16 (Md. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Mar. 18, 1977). This order was issued subsequent to the prepartion of this
article. See generally Melody, supra note 14, at 290-93.
29. Huntington, supra note 1, at 739.
30. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5 P.U.R.4th 28, 38 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974). See also KAHN, supra note 3, at 130; Huntington, supra note 1, at 741, n.263;
Reform of Electricity Pricing, supra note 27, at 203.
31. BoNBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 398.
a. The Inframarginal Approach
An inframarginal charge is a charge "for that part of a consumer's
total consumption of electricity that is unaffected by decisions at the
margin to expand or curtail consumption. 3 - Although such adjustments
result in rates which do not equal marginal cost, the theoretical justifi-
cation of such an approach is that the deviation from marginal cost
that occurs does not destroy the proper marginal cost pricing signal
to the consumer. One commentator has explained that this is because
[t]he basis for this approach is the assumption that consumers de-
termine whether to increase or curtail their consumption at the
margin, i.e. that their decision is based on the price they must pay
for an additional unit of electricity or the amount they save by cut-
ting back their consumption by one unit, not by the total amount
of their bills. By adjusting charges for earlier inframarginal con-
sumption only, the total bill or amount of revenue received by the
utility is adjusted up or down without altering the amount of
electricity consumed by the particular customer.33
An example of the practical application of this approach is a re-
bate or surcharge calculated on a per customer basis. 4 Assuming, as
is likely, that marginal cost rates yield more than the utility's revenue
requirement, the resulting surplus would be divided by the number of
customers on the utility's system. The amount of the resulting "divi-
dend" would then be applied to all customers equally, independent of
the differences in usage characteristics of consumers. To ensure that
the resulting rebate would not, at least theoretically, affect energy con-
sumption, it has been proposed that this dividend be credited to the
fixed customer charge component of the rate. By so doing, the energy
component of the rate, which theoretically equals marginal cost, would
remain unchanged. 5
This approach has two major weaknesses. First, it assumes that
a consumer is more concerned with the actual kilowatt hour rate that
is paid, rather than the total bill; however, even though the specific
amount of the customer rebate is applied to a presumably inframarginal
32. Huntington, supra note 1, at 742, n.265.
33. Id. at 742.
34. See Case No. 6808 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 9, 1976) (testimony of Dr.
John Boland). For another example of an inframarginal approach, see Huntington,
supra note 1, at 742, n.267.
35. As Dr. Boland noted: "[An acceptable and straightforward method of adjust-
ing the total revenue to equal any desired sum is to apply a uniform charge or credit to
each customer bill. This has the effect of modifying the customer charge ...and, so
long as the adjustment is of comparable or smaller magnitude as the customer charge,
very little incentive distortion can be expected from this method." No. 6808 at 22-23
(Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 9, 1976) (testimony of Dr. John Boland).
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portion of the bill, the end result is a reduction in total bill. As the
following example illustrates, the percentage reduction that results
from a per customer inframarginal adjustment varies with the size of
each consumer's total bill and, in many instances may reasonably be
assumed to constitute a significant incentive to consume more electric-
ity.30 Second, and more important, this approach results in rates which
have significant income redistributive effects and are discriminatory
from an economic point of view and quite possibly from a legal point
of view as well.
Assume, for example, that marginal cost rates generate an excess
of revenue that, under the per customer approach, requires a monthly
per customer rebate of two dollars. A small residential user with a
monthly bill of twenty dollars and a large industrial user with a monthly
bill of $100,000 would receive the same rebate: two dollars. Obvi-
ously, the impact the rebate would have on their respective bills differs
significantly between these two users. For the small residential user,
a two dollar rebate represents a 10 percent reduction in total bill; for
the large user, the reduction is negligible. It may be assumed that,
even though the kilowatt hour rate remains the same, a 10 percent re-
duction in total bill would constitute an incentive to the residential user
to consume more electricity.
Moreover, though the two dollars is presumably credited to the
customer charge, both bills deviate from marginal cost, albeit to differ-
ing degrees. The small user pays a total bill which is 10 percent less
than an unadjusted marginal cost bill. The large user pays a total bill
virtually equal to the marginal cost rate. Even assuming that an opti-
mal income distribution occurs when all electric utility consumers pay
a rate equal to marginal cost, it is clear that within the marginal cost
framework itself, this results in a shift of income responsibility from
smaller users to larger users.37 Given that the goal of marginal cost
36. As Professor Huntington has noted, "The amount by which inframarginal
charges could be altered without affecting the customer's total consumption would, of
course, depend upon the value placed by that customer on the consumption of any elec-
tricity." Huntington, supra note 1, at 742.
37. The income redistribution effects of a pure marginal cost pricing approach as
compared to an average cost approach can also be significant. See No. 6808 (Md. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 9, 1976) (testimony of Donald Huber, Richard De Muth, S.J.
Campbell & Armin Wille). Such rates would result in approximately a 35% increase
over and above average cost rates for the same revenue level for these industrial users,
assuming little or no change in their daily operations. The impact could be less for
those who do not run both day and night shifts, but the labor costs of shifting to a
night schedule could be prohibitive.
pricing is the optimum allocation of resources, and given that this re-
sults when all rates for all consumers are priced at marginal cost, there
would appear to be no theoretical justification for providing a relatively
pure pricing signal for large users of electricity and a substantially com-
promised pricing signal for small users of electricity. s In short, the
irony of such an inframarginal approach is that, while purporting to
treat all customers alike, the per customer adjustment results in arbi-
trary deviations from marginal cost rates that constitute a form of eco-
nomic discrimination and, as will be discussed below, perhaps legal dis-
crimination as well. 9
b. Inverse Elasticity of Demand
In contrast to the arbitrary deviations from marginal cost that re-
sult from the inframarginal approach discussed above, distributing ex-
cess revenue or collecting a deficit in accordance with the inverse elas-
ticity of demand approach results in adjustments only for those con-
sumers whose demand for electricity is deemed least responsive to
price. The deviation from marginal cost that results theoretically
would have little impact on the pricing signal received by these consum-
ers and thus, would have little impact in terms of allocative efficiency.
Customers with price elasticity, on the other hand, would not receive
a rebate, since deviations from marginal cost rates would affect their
consumption pattern and compromise or destroy the correct marginal
cost pricing signal. This approach, its proponents argue, compromises
marginal cost prices in a way which has the least impact in terms of
the fundamental purpose of the rate.40
38. It may be argued that this is in accord with a rough approximation of the
demand elasticity of large users as opposed to smaller users. Such an assertion, however,
is based on demand elasticity studies, the reliability of which have been seriously ques-
tioned. See note 42 & accompanying text infra.
39. Professor Kahn has defined rate discrimination in the economic sense as
"charging different purchasers prices that differ by varying proportions from the respec-
tive marginal costs of serving them." KAHN, supra note 3, at 123. See also BONBR1GHT,
supra note 3, at 372-78.
40. See Huntington, supra note 1, at 742-46; Kahn, Between Theory and Practice:
Reflections of a Neophyte Public Utility Regulator, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 2,
1975, at 29, 32; Reform of Electricity Pricing, supra note 27, at 203. Testifying before
the Public Service Commission of New York, Louis A. Guth stated: "Once costs are
determined, however, price elasticity may play a major role in the design of rates based
upon those costs. This is, of course, a reference to the so-called 'inverse elasticity rule.
, *.' In other words, the relative difference between price and incremental cost should
vary inversely with the elasticity of demand. The reason is that the inefficiency result-
ing from the requirement that the rates fall below incremental costs will be greatest for
the most elastic demand; where, at the other extreme---demand is completely insensitive
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Quite apart from the fairness of charging one consumer a rate
based on marginal cost and another a rate that may deviate substantially
from this standard,4' there exists a fundamental practical difficulty with
this approach-the virtual impossibility of presently determining, in any
meaningful way, the elasticity of demand among and within customer
classes. As one commentator has noted, "the implementation of dis-
criminatory rates based on elasticities of demand requires much more
information on relative elasticities than is currently available; at pres-
ent, only crude judgments on relative elasticities are possible. ' '42 Given
the present state of the art, any judgment as to which customer classes
and which customers within a class are demand elastic and which are
not would provide commissioners with broad discretion to charge some
consumers a rate based on marginal cost and others a rate that deviates
considerably from this standard. Indeed, unlike the subsidization that
results from the mechanical application of a per customer adjustment,
the subsidization that results from this approach would, in effect, be
determined by the social and political goals of the regulators involved.
43
c. The Equal Percentage Approach
A third approach to the "excess-deficit" problem is the application
of a proportional, or percentage, rebate (or surcharge) to conform to
to price--dropping rates below incremental costs does no harm at all in terms of eco-
nomic efficiency." Case No. 26806, at 18-19 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, June 30, 1975).
But see Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R. 4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976)
(testimony of Dr. William H. Melody), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 416-
17.
41. See, e.g., Sarikas, Incremental Cost Analysis and Rate Design, in Proceedings
of the 1976 Symposium on Rate Design Problems of Regulated Industries 117, Feb. 22-
25, 1976. See generally BONBRIGHT, supra note 3.
42. Huntington, supra note 1, at 743. See also Grainger, A Practical Approach
to Peak-Load Pricing, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 9, 1976, at 19, 20. See also Cay-
wood, Electrical Utility Ratemaking-1974, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGMHLY, Dec. 5, 1974, at
34, 37-38 [hereinafter cited as Caywood]; Cohn, Should Utility Rate Structures Be Re-
vised To Discourage Electric Use, PUB. UTILs. FORTNmHTLY, at 21, 23 [hereinafter cited
as Cohn].
43. At least one commentator has argued that where excess revenue results, the
exercise of such discretion would be appropriate. See Huntington, supra note 1, at 744-
46. However, this may result in discretion which is effectively beyond judicial review
and rates which depart significantly from the marginal cost standard, thus constituting
undue discrimination. See note 47 & accompanying text infra. Another commentator
has noted that a "pramatic test of a general theory is to see whether its proponents are
willing to practice it under all circumstances and conditions no matter where it may
lead." Morton, Long-Run Incremental Costs and the Pricing of Electricity, Part I,
PUB. U-ns. FORTNIGHTLY, Mar. 11, 1976, at 34. Application of this test when all
consumers are paying a rate equal to marginal cost and a revenue deficit results raises
different political, economic and social considerations. In such an instance, the exercise
of such discretion has been rejected. See Huntington, supra note 1, at 744.
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the utility's revenue requirement. For example, if marginal cost rates
resulted in a 10 percent excess of revenue, a customer paying a
monthly bill of twenty dollars would receive a two dollar rebate, and
a customer paying a monthly bill of $100,000 would receive a $10,000
rebate. Since all consumers would deviate from marginal cost to the
same degree, economic discrimination would be eliminated; however,
in terms of marginal cost pricing theory, the pricing signal provided by
the rate would be significantly compromised. Indeed, a percentage re-
duction tends to bring rates back to a point which approximates average
cost.44 It does not appear that such a rate substantially furthers the
goal of allocative efficiency which underlies the theoretical basis of
marginal cost pricing. Moreover, setting average cost rates in so cir-
cuitous a fashion would appear to be an unnecessary administrative
exercise.45
In summary, it is not possible to charge all consumers a rate equal
to marginal cost. Rates based on marginal cost do not track the costs
actually incurred by the utility, and, as a result, may yield more or less
revenue than the utility is entitled to collect. A system of rebates or
surcharges therefore becomes necessary. Such adjustments result in
rates which substantially compromise the marginal cost theory upon
which they are based and, with the exception of rates which result from
the equal percentage adjustment, are discriminatory from an economic
point of view. Whether such discrimination is "undue" and thus dis-
criminatory from a legal point of view is a separate question.46
44. Three-part marginal cost rates with separate demand, energy, and customer
components that are each reduced by a percentage developed separately for each com-
ponent result in rates that precisely equal average cost. Rates in which all components
are reduced on an equal percentage basis would be distorted somewhat, but nonetheless
closely approximate average cost.
45. See generally Melody, supra note 14, at 290-93.
46. It is important to note that the problems that arise from either an overcollec-
tion or undercollection of revenue have not been adequately addressed by commissions
that have ordered either the implementation or further study of marginal cost pricing
proposals. For example, Madison Gas and Electric Gas Co., 5 P.U.R.4th 28 (Wis. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1974), has been hailed as a landmark case and the harbinger of a new
approach to rate reform, as it is the first decision applying marginal-cost pricing to util-
ity rate design. See, e.g., Cudahy & Malko, Electric Peak-Load Pricing: Madison Gas
and Beyond, 1976 WIs. L. REv. 47; Cudahy, Rate Redesign Today: The Aftermath of
Madison Gas, PuB. UTILS. FORTNIGTWrLY, May 20, 1976, at 15. In the Madison Gas
proceeding, however, the commission did not have to deal with the excess-deficit prob-
lem because the utility's revenue requirement was fortuitously equal to the amount of
revenue produced by long-run incremental cost rates. As Commissioner Cudahy noted
in his concurring opinion: "We may only hope that, in addition to being fortuitous, this
equivalence is well-founded.
"In any event, this equivalence eliminates the need in this case for making appropri-
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2. Undue Discrimination
In addition to setting "just and reasonable" rates that generate suf-
ficient revenue to meet a utility's revenue requirement, regulatory
commissions must allocate this revenue responsibility fairly among and
within the various customer classes. Most commissions are entrusted
with the statutory duty of setting rates which avoid "undue discrimi-
nation. '4 7  Regretably, neither commissions nor reviewing courts have
ever made particularly clear what constitutes "due" as opposed to
"undue" discrimination.4" In general, courts have viewed ratemaking
as a quasi-legislative function and have granted regulatory commissions
considerable discretion in setting rates.4 9  As a consequence, no well
ate elasticity measurements to determine which customers served on which sectors of the
rates should accept the benefit or the burden, as the case may be, of the difference be-
tween revenues based on marginal costs and revenue requirement." .5 P.U.R.4th 28, 50
(1974). See also Rate Design for Electric Corp., 15 P.U.R.4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976).
It is also significant to note that in cases subsequent to Madison Gas, the Wisconsin
commission appears to have reassessed the use of long-run incremental cost as the prim-
ary standard by which to set rates. In a more recent proceeding Commissioner Cudahy,
again in a concurring opinion, noted that though cost studies based on long-run incre-
mental cost are still the rule of the commission, "if the staff must occasionally and for
apparently good and sufficient reason employ embedded cost as a proxy for long-run in-
cremental cost in the interest of pushing toward crucial goals, the end in my view surely
justifies the means." Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 325, 342 (Wis. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1976).
47. See note 3 supra; BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 368, 373-74. A constitutional
equal protection standard has also been applied. See, e.g., Allied Chem. Corp. v.
Georgia Power Co., 236 Ga. 548, 224 S.E.2d 396 (1976).
48. See, e.g., Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974). The court in that
case stated that the "FPC could assist the court if it would define what it believes is
meant by the phrases 'undue preference or advantage' and 'undue prejudice or disadvan-
tage' . . . ." Id. at 864. See generally Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
790-92 (1968).
State court discussion of undue discrimination appears most frequently in decisions
upholding administrative rate determinations. Typically, these decisions rely on the pre-
sumption of validity attached to administrative decisions and have been predicated on
conclusionary findings that the difference in rates alleged to constitute undue discrimina-
tion were not arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Missouri v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 341
S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961). See also Apartment House
Council of Metropolitan Wash., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 A.2d 53 (D.C. Mun.
Ct. App. 1975). See generally BONBEiGHT, supra note 3, at 371-72.
49. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947). The Court stated:
"'Whether a discrimination in rates or services of a carrier is undue or unreasonable
has always been regarded as peculiarly a question committed to the judgment of the ad-
ministrative body .... .' Id. at 347, quoting Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States,
300 U.S. at 304 (1937). See also Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581,
589 (1945); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 203 Ga. 832,
870, 49 S.E.2d 38, 61 (1948).
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defined judicial guidelines have emerged for determining whether such
rates are, in fact, unduly discriminatory.
Allegations of undue discrimination made by a class of customers
or customers within a class often have been resolved by application of
a constitutionally derived rational basis test. Simply put, this test would
uphold the rate structure established by a commission unless a com-
plaining party was able to show that there was no substantial evidence on
the record which could be said to constitute a rational basis for the
particular disparity in the rates complained of.5 0 Although various
courts and commissions have recognized that cost is not the only factor
to be considered in devising a proper rate structure,"' it may be argued
that a more meaningful formulation of this standard is as follows: A
disparity in the rates charged consumers is justified unless it can be
shown that there is no substantial evidence on the record supporting those
factors which constitute a rational basis for charging consumers a
rate that deviates from cost, however cost be defined. This stand-
ard is broad enough to allow for the consideration of noncost factors
in devising a rate structure and thus does not significantly limit a com-
mission's discretion. The standard, however, would require that these
factors be specifically articulated by the commission and that the extent
of the deviation from cost based rates for which they account be sup-
ported by evidence on the record. 2 As a corollary to this approach,
it should also be required that the particular noncost factors involved
be "reasonably" or "rationally related" to the overall purpose of the
proposed rate structure. 53
50. See, e.g., Allied Chem. Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 236 Ga. 548, 224 S.E.2d
396 (1976). The court said, "Because rate making is a legislative act, our test under
an equal protection analysis of this economic regulation matter is whether there was a
rational basis for the differing rate treatment of the complaining industrial class vis-a-
vis other classes, and the rate must be approved unless we find it to be without a rational
basis." Id. at 552, 224 S.E.2d at 399.
Other courts have applied tests which appear functionally similar to the rational
basis standard without, however, labeling them as such. See. e.g., St. Michael Util.
Comm'n v. FPC, 377 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1967); Jarrett v. City of Boston, 209 Ga. 530,
531, 74 S.E.2d 549, 551 (1953). See generally BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 369-85;
PRIEST, supra note 3, at 285-326.
51. See, e.g., International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Mayo, 336 So.2d 548 (Fla.
Sup. Ct. 1976); Tampa Elec. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 398, 423 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1972); Allied Chem. Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 236 Ga. 548, 224 S.E.2d 396 (1976);
General Motors Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 47 Ohio St. 2d 58, 351 N.E.2d 183
(1976). See generally BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 378-85.
52. See, e.g., FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974); Hawaiian Tel. Co.
v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
53. Cf. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972). In deter-
mining whether a classification based on the legitimacy of children was reasonable in
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A flexible cost standard such as this would provide a reviewing
court, as well as the participants in a rate proceeding, with a relatively
objective touchstone by which to gauge the fairness of the resulting
rates. Indeed, without such viable standards, judicial review of the
substance of a rate structure, as distinguished from review of the proce-
dure by which it was developed and enacted,54 would be relatively
meaningless. The broad discretion which regulatory commissions have
and should exercise would become virtually total. As Justice Jackson
observed long ago, "If we are to hold that a given rate is reasonable
just because the Commission has said it was reasonable, review be-
comes a costly, time-consuming pageant of no practical value to any-
one."
55
Using the above cost based standard to judge the validity of the
rates that result after application of the above per customer and inverse
elasticity of demand adjustments raises serious legal discrimination
questions. Rebating a revenue excess on a per customer basis results
in rates charged to customers that deviate from marginal cost in varying
degrees, depending upon the amount of electricity consumed-i.e.,
customer size. Given the primary purpose of marginal cost pricing-
the efficient allocation of society's resources-a strong argument can
granting or denying benefits under the Louisiana wrongful death statute, the Court asked
whether such a distinction had a rational relationship to the purpose of the act involved.
By analogy, given that an order devising a rate structure is quasi-legislative in nature,
a court might legitimately inquire whether the derivation in cost that may result is ra-
tionally related to the overall purpose of the rate reform or structure to be implemented.
54. A number of appellate cases deal solely with the procedures used by a com-
mission in setting rates and do not deal with the impact of the rates themselves. See
generally Note, The Emerging Constitutional Issues In Public Utility Consumer Law, 24
U. FLA. L. Rav. 744 (1972).
55. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 645 (1944). It may also be
argued that a cost based standard is required when applying the statutory standard of
"undue discrimination" to the resulting rates set by a state commission. This is because
the discretion granted to a commission under the statutory provisions by which it is gov-
erned arguably does not extend as far as the limits of state and federal constitutional
equal protection. Thus, application of a broad based rational basis test, though appropri-
ate for the results reached by a legislature, arguably is not appropriate for the results
reached by an administrative body whose actions must conform to certain statutory limits.
This argument would apply especially to rates set by commissions whose members are ap-
pointed rather than elected. For cases applying a statutory rather than a constitutional
standard see e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 11 (1955), af'd sub nom. Inter-
state Power Co. v. FPC, 326 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 967
(1957); Coffelt v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 248 Ark. 313, 451 S.W.2d 881 (1970);
Missouri ex rel. City of West Plain v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 310 S.W.2d 925 (Mo.
1958); Public Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. 150, 153 A.2d 801 (1959); State ex rel. Util.
Comm'n v. North Carolina Consumers Council, Inc., 18 N.C. App. 717, 198 S.E.2d 98
(1973).
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be made that size alone does not constitute a rational basis that would
justify rates which deviate in varying degrees from marginal cost. In-
deed, at least within the confines of pure marginal cost pricing theory,
there would appear to be no justification for the pricing signal to be
relatively pure for large users but increasingly compromised for smaller
users. Although an argument may be made based on the administra-
tive convenience of such an approach, the fact remains that the re-
sulting rates deviate from marginal cost in an arbitrary manner wholly
unrelated to the basic goal of marginal cost pricing.o
Adjustments made in accordance with the inverse elasticity of de-
mand approach, at least theoretically, ensure that the marginal cost
pricing signal is compromised in a manner that does the least harm to
the overall goal of the rate structure. The variances from marginal cost
evinced by the resulting rates are, in fact, occasioned by factors ration-
ally related to the goals of marginal cost pricing. Assuming that eco-
nomic efficiency can be equated to fairness, such an approach theoreti-
cally would constitute a rational basis for the disparity. As noted above,
however, in practice such decisions most likely would turn on whether
the demand elasticity studies which purport to account for these vari-
ances constitute sufficient evidence upon which to base such differ-
ences in rates. Since the present state of the art makes it unlikely
that such studies can reliably justify the resulting variances, a broader
issue presents itself: can regulators' political and social goals that
are unrelated to the goals of marginal cost pricing theory constitute
the primary basis for deciding which consumers shall benefit or be bur-
dened by a revenue excess or deficit?
As noted above, it may be argued that consideration of noncost
factors is incongruous within a marginal cost framework. The primary
purpose of such a rate structure is to maximize economic efficiency.
Adjustments that are unrelated to that goal would be counterproductive
and would raise, as a serious question, why marginal cost pricing was
used in the first place."
Nevertheless, given judicial deference to the broad discretion exer-
cised by regulatory commissions, it is most likely that a reviewing court
56. Similar considerations apply when there is a deficit and a surcharge is in
order. However, in addition to the fact that the degrees to which some consumers' rates
would exceed marginal cost would differ, there is the added fact that such a surcharge
would arguably constitute a users' tax. As noted earlier, the power to tax is beyond the
authority of state commissions. See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
57. The potential benefits of peak load pricing, consideration of future costs in
setting present rates, and even the flattening of declining block rate structures all can
be accomplished within the bounds of traditional average cost pricing philosophy.
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would allow the use of noncost factors in adjusting marginal cost rates.
A narrower question is thus presented: is there any limit to the type
of noncost factors that can be considered in setting discriminatory rates?
Consideration of a noncost factor such as conservation is clearly
within the scope of the ratemaking process."' Though energy con-
servation is, perhaps, best and most equitably achieved when rates are
based on cost,59 it is a rational energy policy goal that should be
within the scope of a commission's expertise and authority. Noncost
factors such as ability to pay, however, involve a commission in a deter-
mination of the social and economic welfare of some consumers. Such
noncost factors, it may be argued, traditionally have not played a signifi-
cant role in the ratemaking process, are unrelated to any specific en-
ergy policy goals, and are beyond the authority of most regulatory com-
missions.60
In either case, the discretionary power that results from reliance on
such factors in setting rates is akin to the power to tax. 61 Whether
there exists a revenue excess or deficit, the commission must allocate
this excess (akin to a general fund) by way of a negative tax or
must impose a surcharge (a direct tax) on some consumers either
to achieve certain energy related policy goals, a redistribution of in-
come, or both. In the final analysis, the rates established constitute
a disguised form of public financing in which some consumers subsidize
others an attempt to achieve certain policy goals that may or may not be
achieved in an unregulated market.
Arguably, the power to tax in this manner, though limited solely
to taxation of electricity users, is beyond the statutory authority of a
58. Conservation, however, is not a factor to be considered under the Natural Gas
Act. See notes 168-69 infra.
59. Case No. 6808 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 9, 1976) (testimony of James
Lim, at 11-12). Mr. Lim notes that conservation can be defined in a number of ways
and thus introduces a high degree of subjectivity into the ratemaking process. Mr. Lim
thus concludes: "As to the effort to achieve energy conservation through 'innovative'
designs of electric utility rates, I doubt the feasibility and desirability of any approach
for using drastically 'new' or different rate forms. The 'new' alternatives proposed in
this case, as well as elsewhere, reflect arbitrary treatments of rates in various respects
including disregard for actual costs and seem to rely on the philosophy that the ends
justify the means-i.e., the rates will, by coercion, result in the desired energy conserva-
tion." Id. See also id. (testimony of David T. Helsby, at 5-6).
60. These arguments are similar to those made against the institution of lifeline
rates. See also Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5 P.U.R.4th 28, 38 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974); KAHN, supra note 3, at 130. For further discussion, see notes 93-108 & accom-
panying text infra.
61. See Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 11
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Posner].
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commission and, in effect, constitutes an undue delegation of the
legislative taxing power to an administrative body.12  Assuming, how-
ever, that such taxation is upheld as an appropriate exercise of a com-
mission's discretion, this discretion would be incapable of effective ju-
dicial review, unless the reasons for significant deviations from cost
based rates are articulated and supported by evidence on the record.63
For example, if it is contended that rebating a revenue excess on a per
customer basis is justified because it encourages conservation, there
should be record evidence to support the proposition that large users
of electricity are less efficient than small ones and thus should pay the
higher marginal cost rate. Similarly, assuming that social welfare goals
can be considered in setting rates, justifying a per customer rebate on
grounds of ability to pay should require, at a minimum, evidence on the
record showing a significant correlation between income and energy
usage.64 On the same basis, a rebate to small users because their level
of use is presumably the least affected by price changes should be sup-
ported by appropriate demand elasticity studies. In short, if commis-
sions set rates which deviate from whatever cost standard is used, fail-
ure to articulate and substantiate, with evidence on the record, the
noncost factors relied upon and their relevance to the policy goal that
is sought will effectively immunize the resulting rates from judicial re-
view. What constitutes "undue" discrimination will consequently remain
an unanswered question.
B. Inverted, Flat, and Lifetime Rates: Alternatives to the Declining
Block Rate
A major goal of many electric utility reforms is elimination of the
declining block rate structure."" The declining block rate traditionally
62. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5 P.U.R.4th 28, 38 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974); Huntington, supra note 1, at 741; KAHN, supra note 3, at 130. But see Posner,
supra note 61, at 41.
63. In a similar vein, Professor Posner has recommended that "agencies and re-
viewing courts insist, in proceedings where the maintenance of an internal subsidy is an
issue, that the amount and cost of the subsidy, together with the identity of the recipients
and of the payors, be calculated and placed in the public record. Perhaps this would
eliminate some of the more captious instances of the phenomenon; at least it would bring
an important issue of public policy into the open." Posner, supra note 61, at 47. See
also FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FPC, 498 F.2d
771 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
64. Even if such a correlation does exist, however, low income consumers who use
more than a subsistence amount of electricity will be subsidizing those consumers-both
low income and otherwise-who use a minimal amount of electricity. See text accom-
panying notes 102-04 infra.
65. See Caywood, supra note 42, at 34; Cohn, Current Proposals In Rate Design.
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has been used as a means of recovering a utility's cost within the
various customer classes, particularly the residential class. This rate
charges a lower kilowatt hour price for additional increments of electri-
city. 6 Despite the fact that there are cost based reasons for this re-
sult,67 critics of this approach claim that declining block rates promote
the wasteful use of electricity, provide large users with unjustified
volume discounts, and are wholly inappropriate for an economy char-
acterized by rising costs."' In place of declining block rates, some re-
formers propose either inverted or flat rates.
1. Inverted Rates
Inverted rates increase the price per kilowatt hour of electricity
as consumption increases .6  This approach is often combined with a
form of long-run incremental cost pricing. 7° The utility's revenue re-
quirement is allocated among the customer classes in accordance with
a standard cost allocation approach;"' however, the rates established,
at least in the tailblock of the residential rate, are based on an estimate
of the utility's long-run incremental cost. Since these costs presently
are rising, this rate, as noted above, is likely to produce excess revenue.
Reducing the rate in the preceding blocks is, in effect, another way
of rebating excess revenue. The end result is an inverted rate struc-
PUB. UTiLS. FORTNIGHTLY, Dec. 18, 1975, at 21; Cicchetti, The Design of Electricity
Tariffs, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Aug. 28, 1975, at 25; Morrissey, The Changing
Structure of Utility Rates, PUB. UILs. FORTNIGHTLY, June 17, 1976, at 15; Wald, Recent
Proposals for Redesigning Utility Rates, PUB. UTILS. FORTNmIGHTLY, Sept. 13, 1973, at
27-30.
66. See NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
67. See, e.g., Wald, Recent Proposals for Redesigning Utility Rates, PUB. UTILS.
FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 13, 1973, at 27.
68. See, e.g., Epstein, A Proposal to Modernize Electricity Tariffs, PUB. UTILS.
FORTNIGHTLY, Aug. 30, 1973, at 24-29. See also Detroit Edison Co., 2 P.U.R.4th 188,
197-98 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974). But see W. VA. REPORT. supra note 8, at
8-9.
69. For a discussion of various inverted rate proposals made before the California
commission, see Case No. 9804, Decision No. 85559, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILrrY COM-
MISSION, OPINION AND FINAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE PURSUANT TO ASSEMBLY
CoNCURRENT RESOLUTION No. 192, at 18-25 (Oct. 1, 1974).
70. See, e.g., Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R.4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976) (testimony of Dr. Eugene Coyle and Robert F. Fischer), reprinted in
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 240, 255.
71. Though there are many methods of allocating a utility's joint expenses or de-
mand related costs, three methods or variants thereof often used are the peak respon-
sibility method, the noncoincident peak responsibility method, and the average and
excess demand approach. For a discussion of these approaches, see J. DORAN, F. HOPPE,
R. KOGER & W. LINDSAY, ELECTRIC UTILITY COST ALLOCATION MANUAL 40-53 (1973);
CAYWOOD, supra note 4, at 146-72.
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ture72 with a tailblock rate based on long-run incremental cost and an
initial block rate below average cost, constituting, in effect, a lifeline
rate.73
Proponents of this approach argue that the resulting rate structure
is, in fact, cost based.74  A major reason for the rate increases recently
sought by utilities, it is contended, is growth in energy use which, in
turn, has led to growth in peak demand. Since economies of scale,
at least as to the generation of electricity, have been exhausted, this
has created the need for new, higher cost facilities. This requires ad-
ditional capital, which, in turn, necessitates additional rate increases.
Advocates of inverted rates claim that a rate which increases as con-
sumption increases places the burden of such rising utility costs on
those allegedly most responsible for this upward spiral-large volume
users of electricity. Thus, it is argued, inverted rates are cost based.
Such arguments, however, have as their basis a number of assump-
tions which are not likely to be supported by the evidence: (1) higher
costs resulting in rate increases are attributable primarily to growth in
energy consumption; (2) such growth occurs principally through in-
creased consumption by customers purchasing energy in the tailblock
of the rate; and (3) tailblock energy growth is primarily responsible
for growth in peak demand. In the first instance, increased costs
leading to filings for rate increases result from many factors in addition
to the cost of providing additional capacity. Principal among these are
increases in the cost of capital, property taxes, fuel costs, and labor.
None of these increased costs is necessarily related to providing addi-
tional capacity, and all can easily result in the need for increased rates
even in the absence of any growth. Second, growth in energy usage
does not occur solely through customers using additional energy in the
tailblock of the rate. As a matter of fact, growth in energy most likely
occurs all along the spectrum, in the preceding energy blocks as well
as the tailblock. Finally, focusing on growth in energy consumption
ignores the fact that it is primarily growth in system peak demand, not
energy growth per se, which contributes to the need for new facilities.
72. See Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R.4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976) (testimony of Dr. Eugene Coyle & Robert F. Fischer), reprinted in HANDBOOK,
supra note 18, at 240, 255.
73. For a discussion of lifeline rates based upon social welfare considerations, see
notes 93-108 & accompanying text inira.
74. See, e.g., Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R.4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976) (testimony of Dr. Eugene Coyle), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note
18, at 240.
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It cannot be assumed that tailblock energy users contribute dispropor-
tionately to system peak demand. As one commentator has noted:
[A] large-volume electricity consumer whose demand falls almost
entirely at off-peak hours, and hence balances the system load
factor, will pay higher prices than a smaller-volume consumer
whose demand falls almost entirely on-peak, even though the costs
imposed on the system by the smaller volumes consumer are
greater.7 5
In short, new facilities must be built to meet the requirements of ex-
isting as well as new customers who do not consume energy in the
tailblock of the rate. New facilities must also be built to replace worn
out and obsolete plants. Shifting a disproportionate share of cost re-
sponsibility to tailblock users is not likely to result in cost based rates,
but rather in subsidization of small users by large users.7 6
Arguably, there is a rational basis for imposing such a tax on large
users of electricity: energy conservation. If, however, tailblock con-
sumers are as demand elastic as inverted rate advocates assume, such
an approach could result in a reduction in total kilowatt hours consumed
without any substantial reduction in system peak. Focusing on conser-
vation of energy rather than on lowering peak demand may thus in-
crease rather than decrease the need for utility rate increases. 77 Indeed,
one advantage of a cost based declining block rate structure is that the
revenue per kilowatt hour in the tailblock is not much greater than the
fuel cost of producing the additional kilowatt hour (fixed costs having
been recovered in the earlier blocks of the rate). Therefore, a
change in sales level does not have a significant impact on revenues.
If the tailblock produces revenues which are substantially greater than
the fuel cost of producing an additional kilowatt hour, fluctuations in
sales due to weather conditions, economic conditions, or similar factors
could cause wide swings in a utility's revenues. 78
A broader environmental consideration may also be asserted as
a noncost basis for an inverted rate structure: a reduction in overall
energy consumption (independent of peak demand) will conserve
scarce energy resources and lessen the overall environmental impact of
the transmission and generation of electricity. 9 Of course, there can
75. Lexonomics, supra note 27, at 162.
76. In addition, inverted one-part energy rates fail to collect the full demand and
customer costs imposed by small users of electricity. See text accompanying notes 89-
92 infra for a discussion of this in the context of flat rates.
77. See Lexonomics, supra note 27, at 163.
78. See No. 6808 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976) (testimony of David T. Helsby,
at 9-10).
79. See, Cohn, supra note 42; NARUC REPoRT, supra note 4, at 17-19.
be no doubt that scarce energy sources such as natural gas should not
be used to generate electricity when more abundant fuels such as coal
are available; however, pricing a relatively clean source of energy
above cost for large users may provide an incentive to use alternate
sources of energy, such as oil, that are environmentally more harmful.
In short, a major change in electric rate design, such as inverted rates,
is likely to affect the use of other forms of energy as well as electric
energy. One proponent of average cost based rates has thus observed:
In order to obtain the optimum utilization of all energy resources
there must be some coordination between the design of rates for
the various forms of useful energy, and a realistic way to achieve
such coordination is to set rates for the various forms of energy in-
cluding electricity, which reflect the costs associated with their pro-
duction and distribution.8"
Furthermore, the argument that inverted rates internalize certain
social costs, such as aesthetic blight, imposed by large users of electri-
city is also erroneous. In the first place, such costs are exceedingly
difficult to quantify and even more difficult to ascribe solely or prima-
rily to tailblock users.8 For example, the deleterious effect upon the
skyline of an inappropriately placed transmission line imposes a real
cost to society, albeit difficult to quantify, but the line serves both large
and small users alike. Even if there were record evidence to support
the proposition that such costs vary with the amount of electricity con-
sumed, attempting to internalize them through rate structure manipu-
lation is likely to result in excess revenues to the utility, necessitating
the complicated system of rebates discussed above. Such costs, how-
ever, can and should be recognized directly, either by direct taxation
or government regulation aimed at specific environmental problems
caused by such uninternalized costs. 8 2  Such an approach is not only
80. No. 6808 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976) (testimony of David T. Helsby, at
26). See also Cohn, supra note 42, at 25.
81. See NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
82. Commissioner Cudahy of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission has
stated: "In my view the most plausible general basis for 'inverted' rates would be the
substantial incorporation of uninternalized social costs into marginal costs. Uninternal-
ized social costs might well contribute to diseconomies of scale (since such costs may
tend to rise disproportionately with size). And diseconomies of scale, presumably, would
have their analogues in 'inverted' rates. In any event, including uninternalized social
costs (not incurred on the books of the utility) would probably produce rates yielding
more than average incurred costs. The excess revenue yield could arguably be compen-
sated by increases in later, strongly elastic, blocks (where usage would be dispropor-
tonately reduced) and possible decreases in early inelastic blocks, resulting in 'inverted'
rates. But as our order in this case suggests, direct control of, or taxes on, industrial
emissions generally may be a more efficient means of achieving the vital goal of inter-
nalizing social costs than the possibly distorting application of 'inverted' rates to elec-
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more effective, but would have far less impact on the general economy
than an inverted rate structure, particularly if applied to the industrial
class of consumers . 3  In short, such rationalizations do not appear to
justify the discriminatory impact of an inverted rate structure. 84
2. Flat Rates
A flat rate charges the same unit price for energy regardless of
the level of consumption. Though rate flattening can be cost based,8""
a common rationale for this approach is that "a kilowatt hour is a kilo-
watt hour" and thus, price should not vary between large and small
users.8" Such a simplistic approach, however, overlooks the cost based
reasons that result in differences in the rates charged within and among
customer classes.87
Every consumer's bill is made up of three basic cost components-
the demand and energy components and a customer charge. Although
all consumers impose such costs on a utility's system, they impose them
in varying degrees, depending upon each consumer's usage character-
tric power." Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5 P.U.R.4th 28, 52 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974) (Cudahy, Comm'r, concurring).
83. As the 1974 NARUC report pointed out, "The inversion of industrial rates
does not make sense. It is not desirable to impose a penalty based on the size of a
plant. Much of industry would be forced to revert to the local generation of power,
which has a much worse effect on the environment than does central power genera-
tion. Increased costs would probably be passed on in the form of higher prices for
goods." NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 33. See also Lexonomics, supra note 13.
84. For a discussion of the social welfare goals sought by the lifeline rates which
result from inverted rate structures, see text accompanying notes 93-108 infra.
85. For example, substantial increases in the cost of fuel over the past several years
have tended to flatten electric rates to some degree. Similarly, if a three part rate is
used-that is, a rate with separate demand, customer, and energy charges-the energy
charge would reflect primarily the cost of fuel and constitute a flat energy rate. See
text accompanying notes 89 & 90 infra. For examples of cost based and non-cost-based
flat rates, see FLAX & DRAZEN, supra note 18, at 36-38.
86. FLAx & DRAZEN, supra note 18, at 16-17.
87. As Professor Bonbright has noted: "On the one hand, there is a strong tradi-
tion in support of the fairness of rate differentials based on cost differentials. But on
the other hand, there is a widely held, conflicting belief in the 'inherent fairness' of a
rule of equal prices for services regarded as 'the same' in some superficial sense and de-
spite marked differences in cost of rendition. This popular preference for rate uniform-
ity beyond the limits justified by the advantages of simple rate structures has been re-
peatedly noted by current economists, most of whom keenly regret its political appeal.
Only under special circumstances can the demand for this spurious equality of treatment
properly claim whatever merit can be claimed for ability-to-pay principles of pricing, or
for those other 'social' principles discussed in the preceding chapter." BoNBRIGIT, supra
note 3, at 125.
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istics. 88  In the case of a one-part, all energy rate, where a consumer's
total bill is based on kilowatt hour consumption, collecting the demand
and customer costs in the early blocks of the rate ensures that the utility
will recover its full costs from all consumers. If the early blocks of
the rate did not contain demand and customer costs as well as an energy
charge, small users would not pay their share of these costs and would,
in effect, be subsidized by larger users. Put another way, if the bulk
of the demand and customer charges are spread equally throughout the
rate (or concentrated in the tailblock of the rate, as with inverted rates)
larger users would be paying a disproportionate share, or perhaps all,
of the fixed costs and customer charges of smaller users. Even if there
were a separate customer charge, collecting all of the demand and
energy costs through a flat energy rate similarly would result in larger
users paying a disproportionate share of the demand costs of smaller
users.
s9
In short, flat rates are not cost based. Unless there are separate
demand and customer charges, a cost approach usually requires a de-
clining rather than a flat rate. The declining block rate, properly de-
vised, is thus a means of recognizing cost differentials between cus-
tomers of varying sizes which are served under conditions producing
different unit costs in proportion to their load size and consumption."
Though the impact of flat rates on energy consumption may not
be quite as dramatic as inverted rates, the same conservation and en-
vironmental considerations discussed above are often cited in support
88. See, e.g., W. VA. REPORT, supra note 8, at 8-10; FLAX & DRAZEN, supra note
18, at 6-12. See generally CAYWOOD, supra note 4, at 22-103.
89. See CAYWOOD, supra note 4, at 37-38. But see Consumers Power Co., 3 P.U.
R.4th 321, 342-44 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
90. Similarly, different use and load characteristics account for differences in price
among customer classes. For example, large high load factor industrial users usually
incur lower demand charges since they are often served at higher voltages and thereby
require less investment in transmission towers, distribution poles, and similar equipment.
Under most cost allocation methods, such users are assigned less of the utility's total
cost attributed to these fixed costs. In addition, these consumers are able to spread these
charges over a greater number of actual kilowatt hours consumed. Similarly, customer
costs such as billing and the installation of meters are also less per kilowatt hour for
large users than for small users. As a result, the average rate per kilowatt hour paid
by large industrial users compared to, for example, residential users often is substantially
less. Residential users, on the other hand, are characterized by comparatively low load
factors, low kilowatt hour use, and relatively higher customer costs. Thus, they tend
to pay a greater rate per kilowatt hour. Cost considerations such as these account for
the differences in rates among customer classes as well as different rates within a class.
The argument that all consumers should pay the same rate, regardless of class or size,
thus ignores these basic differences.
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of such an approachY1 The arguments made against inverted rates,
however, apply equally to flat rates. Moreover, if all energy is charged
at the same rate,
[t]he effect may either be that customers will eliminate their mar-
ginal uses and confine their demands to system peak, thus impair-
ing system load factor improvement as in an inverted rate system,
or else high volume customers will be dnly slightly affected by the
increase and will continue their established consumption.9"
3. Lifeline Rates
A lifeline rate is usually a low, below cost, uniform charge for the
first several hundred kilowatt hours of electric consumption by residential
consumers. 3 Though the details of these rates vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction 4 (some proposals purport to be cost based9") this section
will focus on the primary social welfare goal of these proposals: pro-
viding for a basic minimum of electricity for low income or elderly con-
sumers.
The origin of lifeline rates has been traced to telephone rate cases.
It was argued that for invalids and the elderly a telephone can
mean the difference between life and death in an emergency. In-
asmuch as many people in such circumstances have extremely
limited means, it was proposed that telephone service should be
made available at an extremely low cost to such persons. From
this, the argument evolved that a certain minimum amount of elec-
tricity is a necessity in the modem world and that it should be made
available at the minimum cost so that all could afford it.93
There are significant differences, however, in the economics of tele-
phone and electric services which make the arguments for lifeline tele-
91. See, e.g., Lexonomics, supra note 13, at 162.
92. Id. at 165.
93. See Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R.4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n)
(testimony of Dr. Robert H. Frank & Joe D. Pace) reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note
18, at 163-64, 273.
94. The details of these proposals vary among jurisdictions in term of the "length"
of the lifeline to be provided, the actual rate that is charged, and precisely which custo-
mers shall make up for the consequent loss of revenue. See, e.g., Rate Design for Elec.
Corp., 15 P.U.R.4th 434 (testimony of Dr. Joe D. Pace), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra
note 18, at 309.
95. See text accompanying note 74 supra. See also Rate Design for Elec. Corp.,
15 P.U.R.4th 434 (testimony of Dr. Joe D. Pace) reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note
18, at 33-36. Though a lifeline rate structure often results when excess revenue derived
from marginal cost rates is rebated to customers who have the least demand elasticity-
small residential consumers-it has been recognized that such marginal cost lifeline rates
"cannot be viewed as either a universal or a perfect solution to the problems faced by
the poor and the elderly." Id. at 305.
96. FLAx & DRAZEN, supra note 18, at 52.
phone rates largely inapplicable in the case of electric utilities.91 There
are other difficulties as well. Some commissions have recognized that
the primary goal sought by a lifeline rate-namely, subsidization of low
income electricity consumers-cannot be achieved in a nondiscrimina-
tory manner. As the Illinois Public Service Commission has noted:
The "lifeline rate" concept itself requires that the cost of sup-
plying energy to a certain group of customers to be subsidized by
other groups or customers. Thus, the net impact of a lifeline rate
is to shift expense from one group of rate payers to another and
to distort a rate structure which is fair and reasonable from the
standpoint of allocating economic costs among classes of customers.
Should any direct subsidy accrue to the benefit of the elderly,
the poor, those on a fixed income and other economically disadvan-
taged groups, it should be done through the established legal proce-
dures afforded by the federal and state legislative processes. Ap-
proaches suggested by some intervenors would violate the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Illinois Public Utilities Act, as
amended. 98
97. "[There are significant differences between telephone service and electric ser-
vice which make the argument for lifeline telephone rates inapplicable in the case of
electricity. First, the telephone company can and does offer different varieties of service
available to residential customers. For example, a basic, limited service might entail a
low monthly charge and a charge for every call made, with a higher charge for calls
to surrounding communities. For a slightly higher monthly charge, the user might be
allowed unlimited calls within the community but a charge for calls to surrounding com-
munities. Finally, for a still higher charge, the user may be allowed unlimited calls
within his own community and to surrounding communities. Thus, a lifeline service
could provide a low monthly charge including a relatively small number of free calls
and a high charge for calls above the first few. This would ensure that only those users
who anticipated making relatively few calls would avail themselves of the service.
"In contrast, such distinctions cannot be made for electric service. Therefore, to
avoid legal questions of undue discrimination, the low rate for the first 300 kilowatt
hours would have to apply to all residential users. A second difference is that not all
residential customers pay for their own electricity. Many low income users live in
apartment conplexes where the cost of electricity is included in the rent. In many cases,
such apartment complexes are served under commercial rates so that the lifeline exemp-
tion would not benefit these users. In fact, they would be penalized. A lifeline rate
would result in a loss of revenues which would have to be made up by increasing rates to
all other users. If the commercial rate is raised in order to partially subsidize the life-
line users, the higher price of electricity under this rate would eventually be reflected in
higher rents to the tenants, thereby penalizing many of the users whom the lifeline rate
was intended to help. Also, the higher cost of electricity would eventually be reflected
in higher prices at the grocery store, the laundromat, the department store and in higher
prices for items manufactured using electricity. In the end the subsidy in residential
electric rates would be at least partially offset by higher prices for goods and services
purchased by residential customers. It is even conceivable that a $1 subsidy in residen-
tial rates would be offset by an increase in the cost of goods of more than $1, due to the
impact of sales taxes and percentage mark-ups." Id. at 52-53.
98. Commonwealth Edison Co., Nos. 39359, 39485 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n Aug.
27, 1975). See also Moore v. Gilbert, 131 Vt. 545, 310 A.2d 27 (1973); Potomac Elec.
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Thus, some lifeline rates recently enacted have been pursuant to
state statutes authorizing commissions to implement such reforms. 9
Even if the power to implement such rates is expressly provided, how-
ever, it is likely that such rate structure manipulation will work to the
disadvantage of many low income consumers. The reason is that the
relationship between income and electricity use is not at all clear,
notwithstanding the contrary assumptions of proponents of lifeline
rates. Low income customers are not necessarily a homogeneous, low
consumption group. Many live in master metered dwelling units
where the landlord is billed and passes that cost on to the occupants
through the rent. Others may have large families, older and poorly
insulated homes, and older, less efficient appliances. Still other low
income consumers may use electric spaceheaters and water heaters. 100
Such users would be excluded from the low consumption class and could
find their electricity rates substantially rising under a lifeline rate, in-
stead of falling. 101
Many affluent consumers (those who are frequently away from
home, who cook relatively few meals at home, or who have small fam-
ilies or vacation homes), on the other hand, might fall into the low con-
sumption class. Indeed, low income consumers who use larger amounts
of electricity would not be assisted by such a rate but could, under some
proposals, subsidize moderate to high income customers. Thus, the
Oregon commissioner aptly noted, in rejecting a lifeline rate proposal,
Power Co., 84 P;U.R.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Louisville Transit
Co., 82 P.U.R.3d 1, 7 (Ky. Dept. Motor Transp. 1969); New England Tel. & Tel. Co.,
84 P.U.R.3d 130, 172 (Mass. Dept. Pub. Util. 1970); Public Serv. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 401,
448 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co.,
91 P.U.R.3d 321, 372 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971); Re Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 2 P.U.R.3d 123, 127 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1954); Central Vt. Pub. Serv.
Corp., 7 P.U.R.4th 67, 76 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1974); Rate Concessions to Poor Persons
& Senior Citizens, 14 P.U.R.4th 87 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976); Washington Util.
& Trans. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 10 P.U.R.4th 449, 457 (Wash. Util.
& Transp. Comm'n 1975).
99. See, e.g., Miller-Warren Energy Lifeline Act, CAL. PUB. UTILS. CoDE § 739
(West 1975 & Supp. 1977).
100. Howe, Lifeline Rates-Benefits for Whom? PuB. UTILs. FoRTNIGrLY, Jan.
29, 1976, at 22. But see FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, THE EFFECTS OF RISING
ENERGY PRICES ON THE Low AND MODERATE INCOME ELDERLY (1975).
101. This would be particularly true if the revenue lost by providing a lifeline rate
below cost were to be recovered solely within the residential class. If, however, the rev-
enue loss were spread among all retail classes equally, the additional increase or tax to
be borne by larger residential users would not be as great. Of course, this could provide
an incentive for additional consumption, contrary to the conservation rationale that
often accompanies some lifeline rate proposals.
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that he did not want to be in the position of helping "some of the needy
at the. expense of others equally in need."' 2
Even if there exists a significant correlation between electricity
use and income, a direct subsidy that is not linked to utility rates may
be a more effective means of assisting the poor. With a direct sub-
sidy, such as energy stamps, the intended benefit is received by the
intended beneficiary with a greater degree of certainty.'03  Since
considerable disagreement exists as to whether low use customers-
those who are being subsidized by lifeline rates-are indeed low in-
come customers, this is particularly important. Moreover, a more
uniform pattern of aid is possible through a program such as energy
stamps. Electricity is but one of the forms of energy whose rising
cost causes hardships to the poor. With a direct subsidy, those
whose energy source is electricity would not be singled out for aid
while those whose energy source is gas or coal are neglected. 04 Further-
more, this approach spreads the burden of such a non-energy-related
subsidy to the entire taxpaying public, rather than imposing such a tax
solely on the subscribers of the particular service.'0 5 Thus, with a di-
rect subsidy, there is no need to distort the resource allocation function
that cost based prices serve.' 0 6 Of course, there are a number of
problems with the direct subsidy approach as well, not the least of
which is the difficulty of administering such a program.10 Given the
importance of providing assistance to low income consumers, how-
ever, such assistance should be provided directly, not through the "hit
or miss" approach that results from rate structure manipulation.
In short, as with the previously discussed electric rate reforms,
lifeline rates, as commonly proposed, result in a tax on some users for
the benefits of others. Even assuming that such a tax can be levied,
it is not likely that this approach will accomplish its goal. A direct sub-
sidy should be provided rather than a discount rate that would aid some
of the poor at the expense of other low income consumers.
10 8
102. Rate Concessions to Poor Persons & Senior Citizens, 14 P.U.R.4th 87, 95
(Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976).
103. See Pace, The Poor, the Elderly and the Rising Cost of Energy, PUB. UTILS.
FORTNIGHTLY, June 5, 1975, at 26-30.
104. See id.
105. id.
106. Id.
107. "One difficulty with income-testing in general is that it tends to stigmatize
recipients of benefits." Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 P.U.R.4th 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976) (testimony of Robin M. Williams), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note
18, at 26-27.
108. See generally BONBRIOHT, supra note 3, at 109-20.
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M. Natural Gas Rate Structure Reforms
The chronic shortage of natural gas and its rising cost have pro-
vided the impetus for recent rate structure reforms in the natural gas
context. 109 Electricity is a derivative energy source which, given suffi-
cient coal, oil, or hydro-power, theoretically can be generated without
limitation; natural gas, however, is a primary energy source which is
"elusive, exhaustible, and irreplaceable." 110  The present supply of
natural gas is not sufficient to meet increasing demand. Moreover, be-
cause the price at which producers are permitted to sell gas at the well-
head is regulated by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and at the
burner tip by state commissions, the demand for gas is not limited by the
market mechanism. The problem that arises is how to devise alter-
native administrative policies and procedures to allocate this limited
supply and restrict demand. For this reason, rate structure reform in
the natural gas context must be discussed in reference to the impact
the reforms will have on such administrative policies and procedures
and vice versa.
Unfortunately, the chronic shortage of natural gas in the inter-
state market, with concomitant effects on the intrastate market, will pro-
bably continue for many years to come.1" Significant changes in regu-
latory policy, such as deregulation of the wellhead price of natural gas
dedicated for interstate consumption, eventually may bring the supply
and demand for natural gas into balance. Even if deregulation were
to provide the incentive to begin extensive exploration, however, it
would be several years before such a balance could be achieved. Simi-
larly, attempts to increase the supply of natural gas through the gasifi-
cation of coal, the use of synthetic natural gas plants, and the develop-
ment of Alaskan reserves are not only costly" 2 but are unlikely to al-
leviate the chronic shortages which presently exist. Voluntary conser-
vation programs, of course, are extremely important in discouraging
wasteful uses of energy, but voluntary restriction of demand will not
be sufficient to rectify the balance between supply and demand.
Given this context, most natural gas rate structure reforms advo-
cate the direct use of pricing to reduce demand by discouraging what
are perceived as wasteful or inferior uses of natural gas. A fortiori,
109. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking With Request for Comments-End
Use Rate Schedules No. RM75-19 (FPC Feb. 20, 1975).
110. F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 629 (1944) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting).
111. See, e.g., BuRu OF NATURAL GAS, FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION STAFF RE-
PORT: A REALISTIC VIEW OF U.S. NATURAL GAS SUPPLY (1974).
112. See note 154 infra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
they advocate elimination of allegedly "promotional" rates for large
volume users and purport to imitate, under regulated conditions, the
supposed operation of the free market.'" 3 As in many of the electric
rate reforms, the most popular natural gas rate reforms do not use the
same cost standard for all consumers. As a result, they would shift
among and within customer classes, not only the supply of gas, but
revenue responsibility as well.
In a free market, the prices which result from the interaction of
supply and demand allocate the supply of a scarce resource. In con-
trast, in the regulated natural gas industry, not only is supply allo-
cated through a regulated price, but there is also a nonprice mechanism
for the direct allocation of supply, curtailment plans.' 1 4 Based primarily
upon end uses,"r5 these plans allocate the limited supply of artificially
113. It has been noted that FPC experience in the area of natural gas allocation
has clearly illustrated "the basic difficulty of using traditional public utility regulation,
designed primarily to prevent monopoly exploitation of the consumer, to achieve op-
timum utilization of a natural resource." Koplin, Conservation and Regulation: The
Natural Gas Allocation Policy of the Federal Power Commission, 64 YALE L.J. 840
(1955).
114. Curtailment plans constitute one of the administrative responses made by the
FPC and state utility commissions to the natural gas shortage. Since late 1970, when
supplies of natural gas began to fall short of demand, it became necessary to devise plans
to allocate available natural gas supplies. Under current FPC procedure, each interstate
pipeline experiencing a supply shortfall files a formal tariff incorporating a "curtailment
plan." The curtailment plan sets out the manner and order in which customers' deliver-
ies will be curtailed. The standards against which such plans are measured are those
of sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c and 717d (1970). See
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. F.P.C., 406 U.S. 621, 642-44 (1972). The FPC, as
a matter of general policy, has expressed a preference for priorities of service based
on the end use of natural gas by the ultimate consumers and on the volume of delivery.
Order No. 467-B, 49 F.P.C. 583 (1973).
The Curtailment Strategies Technical Advisory Sub-group of the FPC's Gas Policy
Advisory Council also supports the principle of end use curtailment. Report of the Cur-
tailment Strategies Technical Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission,
National Gas Survey, March 1977. For a comprehensive discussion of curtailment
policy, focusing on the assignment of curtailment priorities according to end use and the
merits of that policy vis-a-vis other possible curtailment strategies, see N. Poer, A Ra-
tional Response to the Need for Natural Gas Curtailment (1977) (General Motors Corp.
Position Paper) (attached as Appendix "B" to the Technical Advisory Committee re-
port).
115. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974); American Smelting
& Refining Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Co., No. RP71-119, Op. No. 754 (FPC, Feb. 27, 1976). See also Southern Natural
Gas Co., Op. No. 747-B, UTIL. L. REP. 11,815 (FPC, May 21, 1976); El Paso Na-
tural Gas Co., Op. No. 697, UTIL. L. REP. 11,547 (FPC 1974), modified in Op. No.
697-A, UTIL. L. REP. 11,615 (FPC 1974); FPC Order No. 467-B, UTIL. L. REP.
11,716 (Aug. 5, 1975); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Op. No. 778, UTIL. L.
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inexpensive natural gas" 6 first to those consumers who put it to the
most valuable uses.' 17  In the absence of complete deregulation, this
is how gas in fact should be allocated. Such plans achieve the goal of
optimal allocation of scarce supplies directly, in contrast with attempts
to achieve that goal indirectly through artificial pricing policies. Such
pricing policies deviate from strict cost of service principles and may,
REP. % 11,865 (FPC, Oct. 12, 1976) modified, Op. No. 778-A, UTiL. L. REP. % 11,880
(FPC, Dec. 8, 1976).
116. Interstate natural gas flowing in interstate commerce prior to January 1, 1973,
is priced at twenty-nine cents per thousand cubic feet at the wellhead, with some such
gas priced up to fifty-two cents per thousand cubic feet. Op. No. 749, UTIL. L. REP.
11,757 (FPC 1975). Natural gas dedicated to interstate commerce during calendar
years 1973 and 1974 is generally priced at ninety-three cents per thousand cubic feet, and
gas dedicated after January 1, 1975 is generally priced at $1.42 per thousand cubic feet.
Op. No. 770-A, UTIL. L. REP. 11,870 (FPC, Nov. 5, 1976). By comparison, the
average cost of alternate fuels and supplemental supplies to offset natural gas curtail-
ment during the 1976-77 winter season is estimated at $2.25 to $2.50 per thousand cubic
feet. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power of the House Comm. on Inter-
state & Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (statement of John D. Christie,
Assistant Administrator, FEA, Nov. 9, 1976). For a comparison of the price of fuels
for residential heating in selected cities from 1971 to 1976, see Petroleum Industry Re-
search Foundation, Inc., Shares of Heating Fuels in Single and Multi-Family Homes,
Appendix I, Oct. 1976.
The average national prices of fuel reported to the Federal Energy Administration
for the 1975-76 winter (in 1975 dollars) were:
Propane at 40 cents per gallon = $4.46 per Mcf
No. 2 Fuel Oil at 38 cents per gallon = $2.80 per Mcf
Residual Fuel Oil at 30 cents per gallon = $2.05 per Mcf
Coal at $18 per short ton = $0.82 per Mcf
Electricity at 2.755 cents per kwh = $8.24 per Mcf
Average natural gas prices for consumers in 1975 were:
Residential = $1.73
Commercial = $1.41
Industrial = $1.01
FEA, 1976-1977 HEATING SEASON: PROJECTED NATURAL GAS CURTAILMENTS AND PO-
TENTIAL NEEDS FOR ADDITIONAL ALTERNATIVE FUELS 51 (1976).
117. Because of the articifically low price for interstate natural gas, many commer-
cial and industrial consumers--especially utilities generating electricity-have, in the
past, opted to use natural gas in applications for which more abundant fuels are (but
for their higher price and greater potential to pollute) equally suitable. A curtailment
policy based upon end use and the relative costs of conversion from gas burning facilities
imposes upon such users the burden of converting to more abundant alternate fuels.
Thus, "inferior" uses of natural gas, such as boiler fuel for generating electricity or rais-
ing steam for industrial or commercial uses, as well as most other large volume indirect
flame uses, are the first to be curtailed. Natural gas is used in these applications solely
for heat generation, rather than for its special properties (e.g., molecular structure, clean
burning, precise temperature control) and this function can be performed by fuel oil or
coal. An end use priority curtailment scheme which differentiates between these pre-
mium and non-premium types of uses, forcing those users who are most economically
able to convert to alternate fuel systems to do so, minimizes the overall impact of the
shortage on the national economy.
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in fact, violate the Natural Gas Act 1 " and state regulatory provisions.
Not only is manipulation of rate structure a less than optimal basis upon
which to attempt to effect rational allocation of scarce natural gas; to
the extent that such rate structures deviate from cost-of-service stand-
ards, they may undercut the effective operation of curtailment policies
and thus undermine the rational allocation of limited supply.
The regulatory concern with fairness" 9 at the federal level is
codified in section 4 of the Natural Gas Act, which makes clear that
the natural gas rates over which the FPC has jurisdiction must be just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. 120  In enacting this provision, Con-
gress intended that natural gas should "be sold in interstate commerce
for resale to the ultimate consumer at the lowest possible reasonable
rate consistent with the maintenance of adequate service in the public
interest.'' 2  This article suggests that just and fair rates are those
which reflect the costs incurred by the utility in serving any given class
of customers. Since utilities are regulated and their revenue require-
ments are fixed on the basis of the cost to the utility of serving its cus-
tomers, each customer should bear that portion of the pipeline's or dis-
tributor's costs which are fairly attributable to the intensity and level
of demand which that customer places on the system. As we noted in
the discussion of electric rates, a rate structure which deviates from this
fundamental principle potentially can yield rates which are unduly dis-
criminatory. 2
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1970).
119. See notes 47-64 & accompanying text supra.
120. "(a) All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas
company for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining
to such rates or charges, shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that
is not just and reasonable is declared to be unlawful.
"(b) No natural-gas company shall, with respect to any transportation or sale of
natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue
preference or advantage to any person or subject any persons to any undue prejudice
or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service,
facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of
service." 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1970).
121. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318, 331 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966). The setting of just and reasonable rates re-
quires a balancing of the interests of the company and its investors with those of con-
sumers. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). However, "the
Commission is not bound to use any single formula or combination of formulae" in ar-
riving at just and reasonable rates. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359
F.2d at 331. It is the result reached, not the method employed, which is important.
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 602.
122. See text accompanying notes 47-64 supra.
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The natural gas rate structure reforms which have received the
greatest attention and which will be discussed in this part of the arti-
cle--"one-part" rates, incremental pricing, and end use rate sched-
ules-all suffer from these basic infirmities: They yield potentially il-
legal rates and threaten rational gas allocation programs.' 23
A. One-Part Versus Two-Part Rates
Natural gas ratemaking has traditionally favored two-part rates-
one part to reflect the rate of energy use, the other part to reflect'the
amount of energy consumed.' 24 The former part, the "demand" com-
ponent, is related primarily to the utility's fixed costs which are those
associated with a customer's basic entitlement to receive gas and with
the system's responsibility to install and maintain capacity, sufficient to
serve maximum needs. Such fixed costs include investment in pipeline
facilities, taxes, and depreciation. The second part, the "commodity"
component, relates more directly to the utility's variable costs. It is
a volumetric component inasmuch as such costs (e.g., the cost of the
gas itself and the cost of compressor station fuel) vary in relation to
the volume of gas delivered to any given customer.
Prior to 1970, the FPC generally used a two-part rate. In the
Atlantic Seaboard case 25 the commission followed what came to be
123. These natural gas rate structure reforms are those which are most often men-
tioned in connection with pricing at the pipeline and distributor levels. The natural gas
industry is comprised of three segments: production, transportation, and distribution.
Producers normally sell natural gas at the wellhead (or at a gas processing plant tail
gate) to a pipeline; the FPC has jurisdiction over the price at which producers sell to
interstate pipelines. The pipelines (interstate and intrastate) transport the gas and gen-
erally sell it to distributors who then sell it to ultimate consumers. Sometimes, however,
pipelines or even producers sell directly to large industrial consumers. This article fo-
cuses on rate reforms which are peculiar to the gas industry and have been suggested
for sales at the pipeline and distributor levels. Other reforms, such as lifeline rates, in-
verted rates, or reverse block rates, have at times been suggested particularly for sales
at the distributor (or gas utility) level. See D. Holmes, Special Problems in Natural
Gas Pricing Growing out of the Natural Gas Shortage, in Proceedings of the 1976 Sym-
posium on Rate Design Problems of Regulated Industries 325 (Feb. 22-25, 1976).
(This paper describes some of the reforms which have been mandated by the California
legislature and implemented by the California Public Utilities Commission.) However,
insofar as these latter types of reforms parallel some of the reforms already analyzed
in the discussion of electric rate reform, they will not be discussed again in the natural
gas context. See notes 7-46 & accompanying text supra.
124. See generally Lapinsky, Two-part Tariffs for Public Utilities: A Brief Review
of the Major Conceptual Economic Literature, PuB. UrnLs. FoRTNmmTLY, Dec. 5, 1974,
at 21
125. Atlantic Seaboard Corp. & Va. Gas Transmission Corp., Op. No. 225, 11 F.
P.C. 43, 56 (1952).
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known as the "Seaboard formula" of cost allocation and classification,
whereby 50 percent of the fixed costs of transmission was allocated to
the demand component and 50 percent was allocated to the commodity
component of a two-part rate. That same year, in Northern Natural
Gas Co.,'26 the commission used this formula to allocate the fixed costs
of production.' 27 By 1963, however, the commission acknowledged
that the direct translation of the Seaboard formula into rate design
might have an adverse impact on pipeline load factors, might dampen
incentives to construct storage and peak-shaving facilities, and might
make it difficult for natural gas to compete in price with other fuels.128
Thus began a trend of tilting the fifty-fifty Seaboard formula to assign
a greater share of fixed costs to the demand component.
The "tilting" of Seaboard costs to make the price of natural gas low
enough to be competitive with alternate fuels was affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Fuels Re-
search Council, Inc. v. FPC.z0 The court, however, reiterated the
seminal rule of FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., '3 that the commission
must not consider the end use of gas in a rate proceeding. Moreover,
section 5(a) of the Natural Gas Act was held not to permit the com-
mission to consider conservation.' 3'
The trend of "tilting" fixed costs away from the commodity com-
ponent of the two-part rate was short-lived. In 1973 the commission
ordered that 75 percent of a pipeline's fixed transmission and storage
costs be assigned to the commodity component of that system's rates. 32
This was done to reduce incentives for pipelines to make sales to high
126. Northern Natural Gas Co., Op. No. 228, 11 F.P.C. 123, 136-41 (June 11,
1952), aff'd sub nom. State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 206 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 922 (1954).
127. But note that in Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co., instead of utilizing the
fifty-fifty Seaboard formula, the commission found it appropriate, for purposes of cost
allocation and classification as well as rate design, to utilize straight volumetric alloca-
tion because the pipeline system at issue was in a developmental stage where it was being
under-utilized, and, consequently, peak loads were insignificant. Alabama-Tennessee
Natural Gas Co., 11 F.P.C. 77, 88 (1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1953).
128. Southern Natural Gas Co., 29 F.P.C. 323 (1963). In another case, the com-
mission recognized a similarly undesirable effect on incentives for addition of interrupt-
ible sales to improve pipeline load factors. United Fuel Gas Co., 31 F.P.C. 1342, 1348
(1964). Commodity rates were designed in part to create these incentives.
129. 374 F.2d 842, 852 (7th Cir. 1967).
130. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
131. 374 F.2d at 853-54.
132. United Gas Pipeline Co., Op. No. 671, 50 F.P.C. 1348 (1973) and United
Gas Pipeline Co., Op. No. 671-A, 51 F.P.C. 1014 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Consolidated
Gas Supply Corp. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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consumption industrial customers. Whether the commission will con-
tinue this new trend of "tilting" toward the commodity component where
two-part rates are adopted remains to be seen. 3 '
The logical extreme of the present trend is the development of
one-part, 100 percent volumetric rates. Such rates recognize only the
total amount of gas usage and fail to take into account the fact that
the rate at which gas is used has a significant bearing on the costs of
delivering that gas. The assignment of all fixed and variable costs only
on the basis of volumes taken thus ignores the effect of load factor on
the demands placed upon a system. 34
Indeed, the fixed costs of serving an individual residential or small
commercial customer are, with respect to the amount of gas he con-
sumes, proportionately greater than the fixed costs associated with
serving a larger volume high load factor industrial customer. While
the former's fixed costs must be recovered from the rates charged for
relatively small volumes of gas, the latter's may be spread across a
larger volume, resulting in a lower price per thousand cubic feet." 5
133. In a recent case, while affirming the initial decision with respect to approval
of the use of the Seaboard method for both cost allocation and rate design, the FPC
postponed ruling on the appropriate methodology of cost classification, allocation, and
rate design until resolution of Tennessee's rate increase applications in more recently in-
stituted proceedings. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., Op. No. 769, UTIL. L. REP. If 11,827,
at 13,974 (FPC, July 9, 1976). in a related matter, the commission noted that quantity
discounts lead to lower rates only where the resulting load factor is improved, but it was
not prepared to hold that rates providing lower unit costs to large users are per se dis-
criminatory. Order Adopting Initial Decision, Southwest Gas Corp., No. RP 74-51
(FPC, July 20, 1976). It was crucial to the position taken by the commission that there
are no industrial customers on the Southwest system and that Staff did not meet its
burden of proof in contesting Southwest's proposed block-type rate.
134. As in the electric industry, customer load factor in the gas industry is the ratio
of a customer's average use to its peak use. Where gas is taken at a completely uniform
rate, average use is equal to peak use and load factor is 100%. On the other hand,
where, for example, a small residential customer averages about 15 Mcf (thousand cubic
feet) per day, but on a particularly cold day uses 50 Mcf, his load factor would be a low
307o. Although the utility would have to maintain capacity sufficient to meet that 50
Mcf demand at any time, most of the time the residential customer is not using that
capacity and, thus, the utility is making no return thereon. The high load factor custo-
mer purchases gas in both the utility's peaks and valleys, regularly using the capacity
which it requires the utility to maintain. Consequently, a low load factor customer's
responsibility for a utility's fixed costs (installing and maintaining capacity) is normally
much greater than its proportionate share of the utility's total volume of gas delivered.
Thus to allocate all fixed costs on a 100% volumetric basis undercharges low load factor
customers and overcharges high load factor customers for the respective costs they force
the system to incur. "Load factor" in the natural gas industry also refers to the ratio.
of a given pipeline's average deliveries over a given period to the maximum capacity of
the pipeline's facilities. LEESTON, THE DYNAMIC NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 181 (1963).
135. The important relationships between load factor, volume, and utility costs bear
Two-part rates recognize that responsibility for fixed costs is not neces-
sarily proportionate to the volume of gas consumed and allow the utility
to recover its fixed costs in the same way they are incurred (i.e.,
whether or not any gas is consumed).
Arguing in favor of one-part rates in the Consolidated Gas
Supply Corporation case," 6 the FPC staff contended that the gas
supply shortage had removed the close relationship between actual
peak-day use and pipeline capacity on which the Seaboard formula had
been based. The District of Columbia Circuit found that the develop-
ment of gas shortages and the resulting excess pipeline capacity pro-
vided a reasonable basis for reducing the demand component. This
situation also provided a basis for moving away from a price differen-
tial based on the extent to which given customers burden the system
and produce a need for expensive peaking facilities. The court, how-
ever, declined to "embrace or approve the Commission's view that a
100% classification of fixed costs to the commodity component would
be proper.' 1 37  The court held that the commission's formula allocating
25 percent of fixed costs to the demand component and 75 percent to
the commodity component gave sufficient consideration to such differ-
ences in cost and was not unreasonable.3 8
Although proportionate responsibility for fixed costs may be
shifting away from low load factor customers due to the existence of
excess capacity on some lines,"' this development does not justify
significantly upon the basic concepts involved in ratemaking. Fuller discussion of the
topic, which is beyond the scope of this article, may be found in AMERICAN GAS AssoCI-
AION, GAS RATE FUNDAMENTALS (1969).
136. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
137. Id. at 1186-87. See also Natural Gas Pipeline Co., Op. No. 782, UTIL. L.
REP. 11,873 (FPC, Nov. 9, 1976). Initial Decision, Colorado Interstate Gas Co.,
No. RP 75-86 (FPC, Dec. 29, 1976). But see Initial Decision, Consolidated Gas Sup-
ply Corp., No. RP73-107 (FPC, Dec. 10, 1976). In that decision, Judge Grossman
declared that logic dictated continuation of the unmodified Atlantic Seaboard formula.
He stated that a shift to the United formula would magnify the risk of declining supply
because of the greater difficulty of recovering fixed costs, and would be inequitable to
high load factor customers who have invested heavily in their own storage facilities.
Nevertheless, Judge Grossman felt compelled to follow Opinion No. 782 and order adop-
tion of the United formula.
138. 520 F.2d at 1187. The court of appeals specifically noted that the United sys-
tem ". . . has been affected by the shortage of natural gas more than any other pipe-
line." Id. at 1186 n.58. United remains the pipeline suffering the most severe curtail-
ment, projecting a 50.98% deficiency for firm requirements for the 1976-77 winter
heating season. See note 177a infra.
139. If a pipeline has excess capacity, that is, if its peak load capacity is not being
fully utilized, there is less justification for attributing the cost responsibility for such
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abandonment of the demand component in natural gas ratemaking. As
with other rate structure reforms currently suggested, the one-part rate
may be motivated, at least in part, by considerations other than cost-
matching. Such broad noncost, social policy considerations may in fact
be providing the strongest impetus toward total elimination of the de-
mand component. 140
The popular reaction against so-called "promotional" rates for
large volume users may accurately point to the fact that low commodity
charges did in the past help serve to lure industrial customers as the
price of gas rose in relation to other fuels. This reaction fails, however,
to recognize that low commodity rates, if based on cost, are not an
incentive for inefficient or wasteful use by large volume customers.
The pejorative connotations usually attached to the term "discount
rates" in this context reflect the failure to recognize an important fact:
it is economically justifiable to continue to use a separate demand com-
ponent to which to allocate a portion of fixed costs, even in an era of
gas shortages, since consumers thereby do pay a rate based on cost.141
In conclusion, the elimination of two-part rates represents a dis-
tortion of traditional ratemaking principles. One-part rates deviate
from primarily cost based pricing procedures and result in a shift of
cost responsibility to large volume users."' Inasmuch as one-part
facilities to the lower load factor customers who are otherwise normally responsible for
the variations in demand necessitating peak demand capacity. See note 137 supra.
140. For example, the court of appeals in Consolidated Gas Supply Co. v.' FPC
based its affirmance of the 25-75% formula largely on its recognition of the "narrow
and circumscribed" nature of the court's role in reviewing a rate order issued by the
FPC. 520 F.2d at 1184, citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 766
(1968), and Natural Gas Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970). However, the
commission's order below had at least hinted that, even in the absence of cost justified
factors, it might have authority to devise a rate structure to serve the goal of discourag-
ing low priority industrial consumption. The commission did not, however, have to re-
concile that hint with -the adverse Hope rule inasmuch as it found that the record justi-
fied a change in the method of cost classification entirely apart from the question of
end use. See United Gas Pipeline Co., Op. No. 671A, 51 F.P.C. 1014, 1016 (1974).
The court of appeals expressly declined to rule on the issue of whether the commission
may rely substantially on noncost factors in making rate structure decisions. See 520
F.2d at 1184. This issue will require judicial resolution inasmuch as the commission
apparently reads the affirmance of its opinion in Consolidated as judicial acquiescence
in the commission's ipse dixit rejection of the Hope rule. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
Op. No. 782, UarL. L. REP. 11,873, at 14,220 (FPC, Nov. 9, 1976).
141. With regard to similar cost justifications for declining block rates in the elec-
tric industry, notwithstanding arguments attempting to characterize them as "promo-
tional rates," see notes 88-90 & accompanying text supra.
142. It may be noted further that the design of gas rates on a 100% volumetric
basis could have potentially destabilizing effects upon utility revenues. Where fixed
rates suffer from many of the practical disadvantages which character-
ize incremental pricing and end use pricing (e.g., incentives to residen-
tial and small commercial load growth, disincentives to conservation,
and interclass subsidization), these disadvantages are explored more
fully in the following discussion of incremental pricing.
B. Incremental Versus Rolled-In Pricing of New Gas Supply
The issue which has stirred perhaps the greatest controversy re-
cently with regard to natural gas rate design is the manner in which
supplemental gas supplies are to be priced.'4 3  Throughout the history
of federal regulation of the natural gas industry, the FPC has consistently
favored rolling in the price of new increments of gas supply. 44 Under
this practice, the costs of new supplies are rolled into the aggregate
cost of the pipeline's or distributor's total supply, and the customer pays
the average cost per thousand cubic feet of that total supply, not just
the cost of the new gas. The primary appeal of rolled-in pricing is
costs are allocated to customers as closely as practicable to the proportions in which
those costs are incurred (most preferably through a monthly fixed charge sufficient to
compensate the utility for such fixed costs, in combination with a variable charge which
recovers the cost of the gas actually delivered), the effects of conservation and shifting
consumption patterns due to curtailments will not be so dramatic vis-a-vis utility rev-
enues. However, similar to the problem presented by inverted electric rates, where gas
rates are designed volumetrically, a decline in consumption may mean that the utility
will be unable to recover its fixed costs. If two-part rates (or the monthly fixed charge
method) are used, the demand component (or monthly fixed charge) will vary as be-
tween classes and customers, while the commodity rate can remain relatively the same
for all customers. With such a structure, if gas consumption patterns change, the util-
ity's revenue remains stable inasmuch as all customers pay the same unit rate for gas
actually consumed. Fixed costs will be recovered regardless of how much gas is sold
during any given period, and customers pay those costs in proportion to the rate of de-
mand which they impose upon the system. Such structure neither offers a use-stimulat-
ing "bargain rate" to large volume customers nor requires any class of customers to sub-
sidize use by any other class. See Washington Gas Light Co., Case No. 647, Order No.
5833 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Oct. 29, 1976) (setting a basic monthly charge and uni-
form commodity rate).
143. "Supplemental gas" herein refers not only to gas acquired through unconven-
tional techniques or from unconventional sources (e.g., liquified natural gas, synthetic
gas, and Alaskan gas) but also to new conventional gas supplies whose cost is substan-
tially above the cost of historic supplies (e.g., natural gas subject to the price increase
allowed in No. RM75-14, Op. No. 770-A, at 2-3 (FPC, Nov. 5, 1976)). See OFFICE OF
ECONOMICS, FPC, INCREMENTAL PRICING OF SUPPLEMENTAL GAS (1976) [hereinafter
cited as INCREMENTAL PRICING].
144. See In re Nueces Indus. Gas. Co., 45 F.P.C. 1224 (1971); In re Kansas-Ne-
braska Natural Gas Co., 25 F.P.C. 448 (1961); In re El Paso Natural Gas Co., 22 F.
P.C. 260 (1959); In re Trunkline Gas Co., 21 F.P.C. 704 (1959); In re American
Louisiana Pipeline Co., 13 F.P.C. 380 (1954); In re Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,
10 F.P.C. 185 (1951); In re Trunkline Gas Supply Co., 8 F.P.C. 250 (1949).
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that, ceteris paribus, it treats customers receiving equal service equally
by chirging the same price to all who take gas from a pipeline at the
same point. This approach recognizes that all customers, regardless of
the volume of gas that they consume, benefit from having the entire
gas gathering and transmission system available to them. While it is
true that old customers of an expanding pipeline are forced to pay
higher prices under rolled-in pricing without receiving any visible in-
crease in service, this approach does insure that one customer does not
pay a radically different price for the same service received by another
customer simply because he has been receiving the service longer.14 5
In contrast with rolled-in pricing, incremental pricing policy esta-
blishes rates based directly upon the costs of the increasingly more ex-
pensive incremental gas supplies. Like the electric rate reforms based
on marginal cost, however, the most commonly suggested incremental
pricing reforms are applied selectively. They do not require that all
customers pay the incremental price. Under these schemes, only
selected customers must assume the higher cost burden of the new
supplies, while the remaining customers continue to pay for gas at the
old lower rates. The underlying principles of incremental cost pricing
theory, along with its adverse practical consequences, merit close ex-
amination.
1. Incremental Cost Pricing-The Theory Stated
The incremental pricing approach most commonly suggested post-
ulates that it is the large, low curtailment priority industrial consumers
who are responsible for rapid depletion of gas reserves and the re-
sulting need to develop expensive supplemental supplies. Thus, it is
argued, regulators should discourage the use of natural gas by these
consumers whose use is deemed to be inefficient and wasteful by im-
posing upon them the full costs of such new supplies. The assumption
underlying this approach is that assigning such consumers a price equal
to the cost of the production and transportation resources required to
provide new gas will discourage them from inefficient use and over-
consumption of natural gas. In this way, consumers will presumably
receive the correct signals regarding the scarcity and costliness of sup-
plemental supplies. Consequently, they will use gas more efficiently, in-
145. See generally Battle Creek Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
See also Northern Ill. Gas Co. SNG Plant Processing (FEA, filed Nov. 5, 1976) (testi-
mony of Jann W. Carpenter on behalf of General Motors Corp., at 9). Moreover, there
is even an argument to be made for charging the higher prices to the new customers
since it is they who created the new demand on the system.
vest more heavily in energy conserving technology, and avoid the ineffi-
ciency of expending more of the nation's economic resources on new
gas supplies than such supplies are worth.' 46
Because industrial consumers are the largest individual users of
natural gas and are thought to have the most elastic demand, most in-
cremental pricing reforms seek to impose the costs of new gas supplies
only upon the industrial class. Even if the assumptions upon which
the thesis is founded were valid, 4 7 the real world problems of imple-
menting incremental pricing make adoption of this theory impractical.
2. Practical Problems
If a rate structure featuring incremental pricing of supplemental
gas supplies were to be adopted, one of the first and most important
practical questions to arise would be how to correlate the separate rate
schedule for such gas with current curtailment policies. At least two
alternatives are available: (a) supplemental incrementally priced gas
supplies could be provided on a firm basis only, exempt from the cur-
tailments to which conventional supplies are vulnerable; (b) supple-
mental incrementally priced gas supplies could be rolled in to a pipe-
line's or distributor's total supply for curtailment purposes. 14 8
146. See INCREMENTAL PRICING, supra note 143, at 17. See also Energy Resources
Council Policy Statement on LNG Imports, at 4, Aug. 1976. The ERC concluded that
rolled-in prices for existing high priority customers and incremental pricing for lower
priority or new customers is "desirable where administratively feasible," but it recognized
that there are serious practical obstacles and conditions precedent to such a scheme's
effectiveness as a national policy. Id.
147. See text accompanying notes 157-71 infra.
148. Both of these alternatives have figured importantly in the ongoing proceedings
in Columbia LNG Corp. v. FPC, No. CP71-68 (FPC, filed May 27, July 7, 1975).
That proceeding arose originally to consider applications filed by Columbia LNG Corp.
and two other companies requesting authorization to import approximately one billion
cubic feet per day of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Algeria, to sell the LNG in inter-
state commerce, and to construct facilities necessary to receive, regasify, and transport
the imported LNG. The initial decision, issued by the administrative law judge who
had presided at extensive hearings, approved the application and assumed, without dis-
cussion, that the LNG would be sold on a rolled-in pricing basis. (No party to the pro-
ceeding had advocated a method other than rolled-in pricing, and such method had been
used in the past for all new certificated supplies of natural gas.) Consequently, the
FPC's issuance of Opinion No. 622 on June 6, 1972, affirming the initial decision with
certain new conditions attached, came as a surprise to all, in that those new conditions
required that the LNG be sold on an incrementally priced basis and that only those dis-
tributor customers agreeing to resell the LNG under a separate incrementally priced
schedule would be eligible to purchase it from the applicants.
Following numerous applications for rehearing of Opinion No. 622 and after oral
argument thereon, the commission issued Opinion No. 622-A, modifying the previous
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a. Incremental Pricing-Non-Curtailable Supply
Some advocates of incremental pricing argue that expensive sup-
plemental supplies should be incrementally priced but that such sup-
plies should be provided on a firm noncurtailable basis. 149  Providing
higher quality service for higher prices may be a justifiable goal, but
it is unclear whether future commissions can effectively be bound not
to divert to other customers the gas supplies that are incrementally
priced and separately contracted for. The courts have upheld the com-
mission's expressly reserved authority to certificate a new gas supply
project on a firm noncurtailable basis and then disregard contractual
provisions by making such supplies subject to its general curtailment
rules.' 50 As the courts have consistently held, the commission's cur-
tailment rules need not be entirely consistent with the provisions of the
commission's prior certificate orders.' 51 The commission's inability to
bind itself and future commissions in a manner which avoids the po-
opinion in two important respects: (1) the condition requiring distributor-purchasers to
agree to sell the LNG on an incrementally priced basis was- eliminated; and (2) LNG
purchased from the pipeline applicants on an incrementally priced basis would be con-
tracted for on a noncurtailable basis.
All three applicants appealed from Opinion No. 622-A to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit solely on the issue of incremental pricing at the pipeline
level, and in Columbia LNG Corp. v. FPC, the court reversed that part of Opinion No.
622-A appealed from and remanded the case to the commission for further evidentiary
hearings on the advantages and disadvantages of incremental pricing. The court held
that the record failed to provide substantial evidence warranting the commission's depar-
ture "from the longstanding Commission practice of approving rolled-in pricing," and
found, rather, that the record reflected an absence of exploration of the problems which
may arise under an incremental pricing scheme. Columbia LNG Corp. v. FPC, 491
F.Zd 651, 654 (5th Cir. 1974). The court noted that the incremental pricing required
by the commission in its opinion serves to discourage the use of imported supplies of
natural gas. Id. at 653.
On remand, the commission ordered that further hearings be held on the pricing
issue; initial and reply briefs were filed in May and July 1975. See note 174 infra.
149. See Columbia LNG Corp., No. CP71-68, Op. No. 622-A (FPC, Oct. 5, 1972).
150. The commission has rejected the notion that contract provisions must govern
allocation priorities stating: "We are impelled to direct curtailment on the basis of end
use rather than on the basis of contract simply because contracts do not necessarily serve
the public interest requirement of efficient allocation of this wasting resource. In time
of shortage, performance of a firm contract to deliver gas for an inferior use, at the
expense of reduced deliveries for priority uses, is not compatible with consumer protec-
tion." Order No. 467, 49 F.P.C. 85, 86 (1973). See also FPC v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 646-47 (1972); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. FPC,
512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925,
934 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FPC not bound by agreements among parties subject to its juris-
diction).
151. See American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Michigan Power Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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tential for future diversion of separately priced supplemental supplies
to other customers raises a serious credibility problem. Even with the
strongest assurance from the commission, no customer purchasing
under such a separate, purportedly noncurtailable rate schedule can ever
feel completely secure in the belief that it will continue to receive its
contractual allocation of new supplies.
Even assuming that this threshold credibility problem can be over-
come, incremental pricing of supplemental supplies under noncurtail-
able rate schedules can ultimately erode the commission's end use cur-
tailment policy. Such a scheme could eventually result in curtailment
of high priority consumers in many areas while lower priority consumers
in other areas continue to receive reliable, albeit more expensive, gas
service. For many reasons, 15 2 purchase of incrementally priced sup-
plies made available under separate noncurtailable rate schedules may
be more appealing to lower priority consumers and distributors serving
those consumers than it is to distributors (particularly small distri-
butors) whose load consists predominantly of residential and small
commercial customers.
Volumes of gas from traditional domestic sources which are sub-
ject to the FPC's general curtailment policies will continue to decline.
Consequently, the combination of incremental pricing and noncurtail-
able rate schedules for supplemental supplies could compromise seri-
ously the important goals which curtailment policies were formulated
to achieve-the economically efficient allocation of scarce gas supplies
and the protection of high priority gas consumers.
In addition to the potential undermining of the commission's end
use curtailment policy, the adoption of incremental pricing of supple-
mental supplies through a noncurtailable rate schedule reduces the
152. For example, distributor A with a high end use profile may opt not to commit
itself to purchase a particular incrementally priced noncurtailable new supply for reasons
related to price, state and local regulatory attitudes, the financial situation of the dis-
tributor, overly optimistic supply assumptions for the future, a low load factor, or inade-
quate storage availability. On the other hand, distributor B with a lower end use profile
may opt to purchase substantial volumes under the incrementally priced noncurtailable
rate schedule because it can obtain long term commitments from some of its relatively
low priority customers who are willing to purchase the relatively high priced supplies
of natural gas because of the valuable security provided by the knowledge that these sup-
plies are not to be subject to the general curtailment rules of the pipeline or distributor.
Distributor B may also be in a more advantageous position and be more able to commit
itself to purchase these supplies because of its more secure financial situation, the atti-
tude of its state or local regulatory agency, the existence of substantial storage on its
system, its relatively high load factor, or its more pessimistic view of the supply outlook
for gas from conventional sources.
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pipelines' flexibility, which could result in less secure natural gas service
to virtually all consumers. The traditional policy of rolling in all of a
pipeline's supplies for both pricing and allocation purposes permits a
pipeline to maintain a relatively high continuity of service to each of
its customers, despite the inevitable occasional outages which cause in-
terruptions in deliveries from particular supply sources. Incremental
pricing of separately sold noncurtailable supplemental supplies, how-
ever, ties each of a pipeline's customers to the reliability of particular
sources of supply. As additional supplies are added through new sepa-
rate noncurtailable incremental rate schedules, one distributor might
rely primarily upon Alaskan gas, while another might rely upon synthetic
natural gas, and still another might rely on imported liquified natural
gas. The result of this patchwork quilt of separate entitlements for
each customer would be to reduce the flexibility of the pipeline to
deal with outages of particular supply sources with service to all cus-
tomers becoming much more erratic. For example, distributor A might
lose 20 percent of its supply for the month of January due to a storm at
sea, while distributor B loses 20 percent of its supply in February due
to a mechanical failure in an SNG plant, and distributor C loses 20
percent of its supply in March due to a break in the pipeline from
Alaska. A combination of rolled-in pricing and end use curtail-
ment would spread each of these risks evenly among all of the dis-
tributors in the system. Thus, no distributor and no group of con-
sumers necessarily would be required to suffer any substantial harm as
the result of a temporary outage of a particular supply source. With
specific supply sources tied to specific distributors under separate incre-
mentally priced rate schedules, however, a temporary outage might
have disastrous consequences at any time for any distributor and the
consumers served by that distributor.
b. Incremental Pricing-Curtailable Supply
Another variation of incremental pricing theory posits that even the
expensive incrementally priced supplies should be rolled in to the pipe-
line's or distributor's total supply for curtailment purposes. This alter-
native suffers from even greater infirmities than the alternative pre-
viously discussed, including the creation of problems of financing, ad-
ministrative manageability, and discrimination. 153
153. See Columbia LNG Corp., No. CP71-68, Op. No. 622 (FPC, June 6, 1972).
But see Algonquin SNG, Inc., No. CP72-35, Op. No. 637-A (FPC, Feb. 6, 1973).
(1) Financing Problems. There is a basic inconsistency inherent
in an attempt to require pipelines and distributors to sell supplemental
gas supplies under separate incrementally priced rate schedules subject
to curtailment. The major difficulty with this combination of pricing
and allocation rules is that it undermines the viability of the vast ma-
jority of supplemental supply projects under consideration by various
interstate pipelines. Such projects are capital intensive and cannot be
initiated without substantial financing. 54 The difficulties in financing
such projects are particularly acute today and in the foreseeable future
because of an extremely tight money market. Adoption of incremental
pricing for supplemental supplies subject to curtailment would, in all
likelihood, create a serious obstacle to efforts to obtain financing for
supplemental supply projects, thereby deterring efforts to develop new
sources of supply. In an era when regulatory bodies should be exerting
all reasonable efforts to create incentives to stimulate the development
of new gas supplies, such a disincentive hardly seems appropriate.
Financial institutions generally have been willing to fund major
gas supply projects in the past only when presented with firm long term
contracts with individual customers which bind those customers to pur-
chase the new supplies on a regular basis for the entire term of the
proposed financing of the project.155 Firm long term contracts of this
type can be obtained from consumers or distributors only when they
are assured that they will receive the full benefit of the supply for its
154. Current estimates for the total project costs of bringing gas from Prudhoe Bay
(Alaska) to the United States (lower 48 states) market range from $6.3 billion to $9.3
billion. Transportation costs alone to bring that gas to the average domestic market are
estimated to be between $1.42 and $2.34 per MMBtu. See Initial Brief for the Alcan
Project on Economic Matters, App. A, El Paso Alaska Co., No. CP75-96 (FPC, Nov.
19, 1976). The costs estimated in 1972 for the Columbia LNG project were $628 mil-
lion. Columbia LNG Corp., Op. No. 622, 47 F.P.C. 1624, 1631 (1972). Consumers
Power Company's facility in Marysville, Michigan, for the conversion of natural gas
liquids into synthetic natural gas opened in July 1973 and cost $155 million. Brief of
Consumers Power Company in Opposition to Consolidation, In re Natural Gas Liquids
Regulation Litigation, No. 278 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, filed Nov. 5,
1976). A similar facility operated by Northern Illinois Gas Company since August 1974
cost more than $82 million. Response of Illinois Commerce Commission and Northern
Illinois Gas Company to Order to Show Cause, In re Natural Gas Liquids Regulation
Litigation, No. 278 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, filed Nov. 18, 1976). A
coal gasification plant proposed by Transwestern Coal Gasification Company was esti-
mated in mid-1973 to cost $447 million. No. 73-211, Op. No. 728, at 3 (FPC, Apr. 21,
1975). See generally Wall St. Journal, Mar. 18, 1977, at 28, col. 2.
155. See El Paso Alaska Co. No. CP75-96 (FPC, 1976) (testimony of witnesses
from Alcan Pipeline Co., El Paso Alaska Co. and Alaska Arctic Gas Pipeline Co.).
See generally Algonquin SNG, Inc., No. CP72-35, Op. No. 637-A (FPC, Feb. 6, 1973);
Transwestern Pipeline Co., No. CP73-21 1, Op. No. 728-A (FPC, Nov. 21, 1975).
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duration subject only to the risks of failure ordinarily associated with
the particular supply. It is improbable that any consumer or distributor
would commit itself to a long term firm contract for an expensive incre-
mentally priced supply which is subject to diversion to others merely
upon the continuing and probable deterioration of the supply available
from traditional domestic sources.
In short, consumers, distributors, and investors will pay a premium
for the ability to quantify with some degree of certainty the risks in-
herent in embarking upon a new supplemental supply project. Once
that certainty is destroyed, as it would be under incremental pricing
subject to curtailment or reallocation, it will be increasingly difficult-
perhaps eventually impossible-to find investors, consumers, or distri-
butors who are willing to make the firm long term contractual commit-
ments essential to the viability of any major supplemental supply pro-
ject.
(2) Administrative Problems. A further question arises from the
prospect of pricing new gas supplies according to separate rate sche-
dules but making them subject to ordinary curtailment: Can such a po-
licy be practically administered? Even if such a policy were economi-
cally justified, prudent ratemaking would compel its rejection if it were
so complex that it was administratively unworkable."56 An adminis-
trative decision to adopt such incremental pricing in any given rate case
cannot be considered in isolation. Such a decision can be made re-
sponsibly only after consideration of the consequences which are likely
to develop for any given system if successive increments of gas made
available from a variety of supplemental supply projects were sold under
separate incremental pricing schedules. The administration of multiple
incremental pricing schedules for various supplemental supply sources
would be a nightmare for regulator and regulated alike. Frequent
controversies among customers would probably result as to both (1)
the appropriate total volume of gas which they should be permitted
to receive from each source during a particular period and (2) the
total price which they should be required to pay for those volumes.
The fact that many pipelines purchase significant portions of their
total gas supplies from a number of other pipelines, who themselves
may be developing one or more supplemental supply projects, amplifies
the administrative complexities of such an approach. Accordingly, as
each of the pipelines supplying pipeline A (or distributor A) drew on its
156. See BoNBrnnrr, supra note 3, at 289.
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successive supplemental projects, pipeline A would be forced to revise
its rate schedules and add several more tiers of schedules, all with dif-
fering allocation provisions and different prices. A staggering mathe-
matical progression of rate schedules and the need for their constant re-
vision would thus face a pipeline or distributor served by a large num-
ber of pipelines with a large number of supplemental sources. Such
administrative problems, together with the potentially high transaction
costs involved with the implementation of a policy combining curtail-
ment with incremental pricing, must be faced squarely in an analysis
of alternate rate structure policies.
(3) The Benefits of Supplemental Supplies and Lack of Justifi-
cation for Discriminatory Rates. Apart from the financing and adminis-
trative difficulties created by incremental pricing of curtailable supple-
mental supplies, such a rate structure may result in undue discrimi-
nation. Under end use curtailment, 15 those customers who are clas-
sified in the higher priority categories of a curtailment plan will, of
course, receive service which is much more reliable than service re-
ceived by lower priority customers. Since continuity of service is a
major component of the value of a product such as natural gas, this
means that the highest priority customers, who suffer no curtailment
or relatively little curtailment, would be receiving a more valuable pro-
duct than lower priority customers. At the same time, if supplemental
supplies are priced according to curtailable incremental rate schedules,158
the lower priority customers will nevertheless be paying substantially
more for an inferior product. Price discrimination has been defined as
"the practice of charging different rates to different customers for sub-
stantially the same product." '159 Clearly, such discrimination is increased
where customers receiving an inferior product because of unreliable
service are nonetheless charged more than customers receiving a su-
perior product.160
At least two arguments might be offered to justify such discrimi-
nation against lower priority customers. First, expensive supplemental
gas supplies are obtained primarily for the benefit of the lowest priority
consumers receiving service and, therefore, they should bear the costs
of obtaining these supplies. Second, it is desirable to discourage in-
157. See notes 114, 117 supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 153-57 supra.
159. BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 374.
160. Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act and parallel provisions of many state regu-
latory statutes do not prohibit discrimination per se, but rather only undue discrimina-
tion. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1970). For a discussion of undue discrimination, see text ac-
companying notes 47-64 supra.
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dustrial use of natural gas by encouraging lower priority consumers to
use alternate fuels, thereby encouraging conservation through the rate
structure. 1' 1
The first argument is factually untrue and the second is unsupported.
In times of critical shortage of natural gas, when supply projections are
under constant downward revision, it is impossible to determine in ad-
vance which classes of customers will receive natural gas service as a
result of the addition of a new gas supply source. Virtually all gas sup-
plies transported in interstate commerce in pipelines and distribution
systems contain a commingled mixture of old conventional natural gas
at low prices, newer conventional natural gas at higher contract prices,
and synthetic or imported gas produced at very high prices. All cus-
tomers receive deliveries from this mixture of gas purchased at many
different prices from many different sources. It is unrealistic to assume,
for purposes of allocating costs among gas consumers, that the low priced
gas is actually being delivered to the residential and small commercial
customers, while only the industrial customers are consuming the higher
priced gas.' 6 2  Not only is it erroneous to believe that this is what
actually happens, it also may constitute undue discrimination for a regu-
latory commission to create a legal fiction which "adjusts" engineering
reality to notions of what some think should happen as a matter of po-
licy. With the continuing decline in the availability of gas from tradi-
tional sources, customers in even the highest priorities may receive ser-
vice from time to time which unquestionably is from a new supply
source. Curtailment projections are not reliable enough to provide any
significant guidance as to who will actually benefit.
Furthermore, all customers in all priorities receive immediate
benefits from the addition of new supply sources by way of a greater
measure of protection against curtailment and a reduction in costs.
Even if a particular customer or class of customers does not receive
additional supplies immediately as a direct result of the addition of a
supplemental source, they do receive an immediate, economic benefit
because the availability of such new supplies in the future decreases
the risk of curtailment for all customers. The attachment of the new
supply also decreases the portion of the pipeline's capacity costs which
must be borne by each customer. In this way, customers receive an
161. These arguments were articulated by the commission Staff's expert witness in
Columbia LNG Corp., 47 F.P.C. 1624 (1972) (transcript at 7486 et seq.).
162. Cf. California v. Lo Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366, 369 (1965). In Lo
Vaca it was held that federal jurisdiction follows the actual flow of natural gas, using
"an engineering and scientific, rather than a legalistic or governmental, test."
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immediate and direct rate benefit as a result of a pipeline's greater utili-
zation of its capacity.
In addition, there is a fundamental flaw in the line of reasoning
that since lower priority customers suffer the most immediate effects
of a gas shortage, they enjoy the most immediate effects of the addition
of supplemental supplies and should, therefore, be required to absorb
the full cost of new supplies. Such an argument misperceives the inter-
relationship between curtailment policy and pricing policy.
Establishing curtailment priorities and designing pipeline rates in-
volve two entirely different concepts. In determining a policy for the
curtailment of natural gas supplies during times of chronic shortage, the
FPC decides adminsitratively which consumers should be preferred in
terms of continuity of service when the supply of gas is inadequate to
meet the demands of all consumers. The commission has attempted
to resolve this problem by designing curtailment policies based prima-
rily upon the end use to which the gas is put.163 After the commission
has isolated the uses for which conversion is the most difficult and ex-
pensive-residential, small commercial and nonsubstitutable industrial
process, feedstock and plant protection requirements-it distinguishes
among these high priority uses on the basis of safety'14 and, at least
implicitly, political considerations. While it may be more economically
burdensome to convert some industrial uses to alternate fuels than to
convert residential and small commercial uses, it would not be reason-
able to impose upon the individual homeowner the burden of con-
verting to an alternative fuel.' 65
In contrast with curtailment decisions, designing pipeline rates is
an entirely different type of administrative decision. The issue is not
who will receive the available gas, but rather what rate each consumer
will be required to pay for it. There is an interrelationship between
these two decisions-the rules in the two contexts must be made con-
sistent with one another and must be designed to further a cohesive
policy-but the criteria used by the commission to make the first de-
cision cannot be borrowed and applied in making the second. In no
sense of the word does it "cost" more to serve consumers classified for
purposes of curtailment in Priority Two or lower than it does to serve
163. See note 117 supra.
164. Small volume residential and commercial uses cannot safely be curtailed, as
a reduction of pressure in gas distribution lines creates a serious risk of explosions.
165. See N. Poer, A Rational Response to the Need for Natural Gas Curtailment
30-31 (1977) (General Motors Corp. Position Paper).
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Priority One consumers. Thus, a rate structure based on factors relied
upon to establish curtailment priorities would constitute an erroneous
allocation of cost.
The second argument used to justify rate discrimination against
lower priority consumers generally is supported neither by empirical evi-
dence nor by judicial authority. It is far from clear that incremental
pricing of supplemental gas supplies (whether or not subject to curtail-
ment) will encourage lower priority customers either to conserve natural
gas or to switch to the use of alternative fuels. As in the context of
electricity, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the relative demand
elasticities for natural gas among consumers generally and among the
various end use curtailment priorities specifically. Moreover, given
current and projected deep levels of curtailment (where, for example,
customers in only Priorities One and Two actually receive any gas on a
consistent basis) perhaps the only meaningful elasticity comparisons
could be made between the highest priorities. But even if these high
priority use elasticities could be determined accurately, it is doubtful
that they would support the incremental pricing assumption that indus-
trial demand is more elastic than residential and commercial demand.
Process, feedstock, and plant protection end uses, by definition, 160 lack
alternate fuel capability. It is improbable that any study would show a
greater elasticity of demand for natural gas among these Priority Two
customers than among the residential and small commercial users in
Priority One.117
166. "(6) Plant protection gas. Is defined as minimum volumes required to pre-
vent physical harm to the plant facilities or danger to plant personnel when such pro-
tection cannot be afforded through the use of an alternate fuel. This includes the pro-
tection of such material in process as would otherwise be destroyed, but shall not include
deliveries required to maintain plant production. For the purposes of this definition pro-
pane and other gaseous fuels shall not be considered alternate fuels.
"(7) Feedstock gas. Is defined as natural gas used as raw material for its chem-
ical properties in creating an end product.
"(8) Process gas. Is defined as gas use for which alternate fuels are not tech-
nically feasible such as in applications requiring precise temperature controls and
precise flame characteristics. For the purposes of this definition propane and other gas-
eous fuels shall not be considered alternate fuels." 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(c)(6)-(8).
167. Indeed, it may be more difficult and more expensive to convert many Priority
2 uses than it is to convert Priority 1 uses. Although pure end use principles may justify
the classification of residential and small commercial uses in the very highest priority,
such classification is lent additional support by a combination of social, administrative,
political, and safety factors. While it is true, then, that, relative to the small individual
amounts of gas conserved, the cost of converting or replacing millions of home furnaces,
water heaters, dryers, and stoves would be astronomical, it is also true that the costs
to some industrial feedstock and process uses of completely scrapping existing facilities
and installing alternate energy facilities (even if technologically possible) may also
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There is a similar lack of hard evidence that incremental pricing
would significantly enhance conservation. To demonstrate such a con-
nection would require a detailed comparison of the potential for conser-
vation by residential and small commerical consumers with the poten-
tial for conservation by high priority industrial consumers. The addi-
tional incentive for conservation by industrial consumers which con-
ceivably may be provided by incremental pricing may well be more than
offset by the reduced incentive for conservation by residential and small
commercial customers who will continue to receive gas at a price well
below the pipeline's average cost of gas.
Moreover, even if it could be shown that incremental pricing of
curtailable supplemental supplies encourages greater conservation and
discourages use of natural gas by industrial consumers, the courts have
held that the FPC cannot consider either of these factors in establishing
the rates for an interstate pipeline. As the Supreme Court held in FPC
v. Hope Natural Gas Company, "Moreover, we fail to find in the power
to fix 'just and reasonable' rates the power to fix rates which will dis-
allow or discourage resales for industrial use.' 168 And more recently,
the Seventh Circuit, in Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. FPC, stated
even more explicitly that "the Commission is not authorized to consider
the end use of natural gas in a rate proceeding. . . . In rate pro-
ceedings under section 5(a), conservation is not a factor which the
Commission can consider." 169 It is possible, of course, that under to-
day's chronic shortage conditions courts might reach a different con-
clusion. Yet even if conservation were a proper consideration in a
rate proceeding, a proposal which confronted only industrial con-
sumers with accurate price signals and the need for conservation could
be counterproductive as well as discriminatory if it permitted millions
of smaller nonindustrial users to continue using deceptively inexpensive
gas without regard to their need for conservation.
17
Conservation is an important objective for all consumers. Large
volume use cannot be rationally equated with wasteful use, nor can
be astronomical in an absolute sense, as well as in the sense of the cost per Mcf
conserved. Faced with such costs and speculative technologies, many of these consumers
may be forced out of business.
168. 320 U.S. 591, 616 (1944).
169. 374 F.2d 842, 854 (7th Cir. 1967).
170. Since residential and small commercial demand is not presently being re-
strained inasmuch as curtailments do not generally reach those levels, it is even more
important that the financial incentives to conserve natural gas not be diluted or totally
eliminated.
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small volume use be equated with efficient use. If, then, regulators
insist on manipulating pricing policy to spur conservation, they cannot
rely on such simplistic assumptions. Pricing incentives and disincen-
tives, if properly considered in devising a rate structure, should be more
sensitive to the conservation potential of all classes of customers, espe-
cially high priority industrial process and feedstock customers.
A preferable approach to encouraging conservation is the use of
narrowly drawn measures which focus directly on problems of wasteful
consumption. Such measures include legislative prohibitions of the use
of natural gas for specific nonpremium uses, building code minimum
requirements for insulation in housing and other buildings, peak-flat-
tening incentives, and tax incentives which reward investment in
energy saving equipment. These devices reflect a recognition of the
need for conservation on the part of all consumers and a recognition
that demand elasticity and conservation potential are not necessarily
related to ,size or to whether a customer is "residential" or "industrial."
Moreover, such measures avoid the kind of tinkering with the pricing
system which can yield unduly discriminatory rates.
Incremental pricing of curtailable new gas supplies thus discrimi-
nates economically against lower priority consumers. In the absence of
any reasonable justification for such treatment, which deviates from
cost based rates and from the premise that consumers should pay
equally for equal service, it may be that such discrimination is indeed
"undue" and, therefore, is legal discrimination as well.' 7'
3. Rolled-In Pricing
As has been discussed, it is not possible to isolate a particular class
of customers which benefits from a new supply increment. 7 2 It conse-
quently appears to be discriminatory to impose the full cost of such
supplies on only certain classes of customers, as is the case in most incre-
mental pricing plans. Rather, all customers should be required to bear
a proportionate share of the cost of new gas supplies. The traditional
rolled-in pricing mechanism, through which new supplies are averaged
into the pipeline's or distributor's total supply for purposes of pricing,
permits the costs of such supplies to be borne fairly by all consumers
who benefit from them.173
171. For a discussion of undue discrimination, see text accompanying notes 47-64
supra.
172. See Columbia LNG Corp., 48 F.P.C. 735 (1972) (Nassikas, concurring). See
text accompanying notes 138-45 supra.
173. Analogizing from the natural gas context, an administrative judge has noted:
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Rolled-in pricing provides high priority consumers with gas of the
same physical and chemical properties as that provided to low priority
consumers, but with a higher continuity of service. At the same time,
the high priority consumer pays the same average cost for the commod-
ity it receives as the low priority consumer. Thus, rolled-in pricing
combined with end use curtailment treats high priority consumers fairly
vis- t-vis lower priority consumers: the former receive a higher quality
product (given that continuity of service is a major factor in de-
termining the value of a commodity like natural gas) at the same rate
as that charged to the latter for a lower quality product. In this
manner, consumers share the proportionate costs of the service they re-
ceive. Such a rate structure does not discriminate and should not be
discarded in favor of one which would have lower priority customers
pay the highest rate for the gas they receive while being entitled to
the lowest continuity of service.' 74
"If an old, low-cost gas pipeline adds a new pipe or 'barrel' to double the capacity, but
the new one is at today's higher prices, it would be unheard-of to assign the cheaper half
to the old customers, or to the new ones, or to the retails, or to the wholesales. It is
all rolled in together." Initial Decision of Administrative Judge on a Rate Increase Fil-
ing, at 37, Alabama Power Co., No. E-8851 (FPC, Oct. 22, 1976), citing Battle Creek
Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1960); United Gas Pipeline Co., 31 F.P.C.
1180, 1196 (1964). See also P. D'Agostino, Impact of the Gas Supply Shortfall on Pric-
ing, in Proceedings of the 1976 Symposium on Rate Design Problems of Regulated In-
dustries 345 (Feb. 22-25, 1976). This paper outlines five reasons why LNG and SNG
should be rolled in and not sold by pipelines or distributors on an incremental basis.
174. Just prior to publication, the FPC issued Opinion No. 786 in the remanded
proceeding in Columbia LNG Corp., No. CP71-68, (FPC, Jan. 21, 1977). See note 148
supra. In this opinion, the commission modifies Opinion Nos. 622 and 622-A to delete
the incremental pricing requirement and thus permit the LNG supply to be sold by the
pipeline company applicants on a rolled-in basis and to be made subject to curtailment.
Columbia LNG Corp., supra at 17. The commission emphasizes that the gas supply
situation for the three pipeline applicants has deteriorated very rapidly since 1972, and
concludes that the three controlling reasons stated in Opinion No. 622-A in 1972 for
the adoption of incremental pricing are no longer "as convincing" in light of 1976 supply
and price levels in conjunction with the commission's evolving curtailment policies. Id.
at 6, 7-10, 12.
In Opinion 622-A, the FPC had justified incremental pricing on three principal
grounds: (1) such pricing would allow distributors to choose between purchasing new
gas supplies from the pipelines and developing their own supplies; (2) customers in the
lower curtailment priorities would benefit principally from the supplemental supplies,
and thus they should bear the full cost of the LNG; and (3) incremental pricing would
provide a better test of the potential market for the new supply. In Opinion No. 786,
however, the commission realizes that, given the deteriorating supply and the threat of
curtailment to customers in even the highest priorities, supplemental supplies would
actually "operate as replacement gas which has been supplied from historic sources." Id.
at 12. It recognizes that the "incremental pricing mechanism established by Opinion
No. 622-A would allow lower priority customers, who have contracted for the supple-
mental supply, to receive adequate service while higher priority customers would be
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4. Across-the-Board Incremental Pricing-A Possible Alternative
Although the most popular incremental pricing proposals impose
the cost of supplemental gas supplies only on industrial consumers, a
recent proposal offered by the FPC's Office of Economics suggests a
fairer approach. This proposal may offer greater opportunity for
threatened by severe curtailment," in conflict with the commission's end use curtailment
policy. The commission expressly admits that "it cannot guarantee that future Com-
missions would not allocate to the highest priority customers the supplemental supply
should no other supply of natural gas exist within a market area" since assurance of
noncurtailable supply "is not in the public interest" as the supply shortfall becomes more
drastic. Id. at 12, 13. See text at notes 150-51 supra.
Citing the general advantages of rolled-in pricing (see text at note 145 supra) and
the fact that it has employed rolled-in pricing throughout the history of natural gas regu-
lation (see text at note 144 supra), the commission mentions some of the problems, dis-
cussed herein, with regard to incremental pricing. First, the commission notes that "a
policy requiring the sale of supplemental supplies under separate noncurtailable incre-
mentally priced rate schedules will result in reduced reliability of service for all cus-
tomers." Pipelines would have reduced flexibility since each supply source would be tied
to a separate group of customers, and distributors would have reduced flexibility to adjust
to temporary interruptions in deliveries from a particular supply source. Id. at 14.
See pp. 1130-31 supra. Second, the commission notes that, as additional supplemental
supplies are made available through separate rate schedules, separate entitlements for each
customer will evolve. See pp. 1133-34 supra. Third, the commission recognizes that
incremental pricing subject to curtailment has even more serious problems, not the least
of which is the fact that "financing of supplemental supply projects would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible." Id. at 14. See pp. 1132-33 supra.
The commission thus concludes that the features of incremental pricing which it
formerly found persuasive "are not predominant today." Id. at 15. An additional reason
for this is the fact that costs of domestic supply are now more competitive with "uncon-
ventional" supplies, and the latter can no longer be viewed as "expensive exotic supply."
"Once in the pipeline, the characteristics of the supplemental supply are indistinguish-
able from those from conventional sources." Id. at 14. See pp. 1135 supra. Opinion
No. 786 recognizes that supplemental supplies are an integral part of the baseload supply
for high priority customers and that "[bly allowing these pipelines to roll-in in the LNG
for pricing and allocation purposes, customers are afforded the greatest reliability of
service." Id. at 16. High priority customers should thus bear part of the cost of supple-
mental supplies since such supplies give them greater assurance of continued supply for
their immediate potential use in the face of curtailments, and they will ultimately have
full benefit of these supplies as gas supply generally decreases. See pp. 1135-36 supra.
The commission takes care to emphasize in Opinion No. 786, however, that its de-
termination that rolled-in pricing is proper in this proceeding "is not intended to signal
a precedent to be applied in other supplemental supply projects. . . in the future. Id.
at 17. Finding it impossible, because of the complexity of the pricing issue and the
number of variable factors which affect it, to develop a uniform policy which would fit
all circumstances, the commission states its intention to base future pricing decisions on
the specific factors which are relevant in each particular supplemental supply proceeding.
Hence, even if Opinion No. 786 is affirmed on appeal, the question whether supple-
mental gas supplies should be rolled in for pricing and allocation purposes remains very
much a live issue.
achieving some of the stated goals of incremental cost pricing theory'
75
while at the same time recognizing the manner in which natural gas is
actually consumed in the various curtailment categories.
The Office of Economics proposal suggests the following pro-
cedure for selling gas at the pipeline level:
(1) Retain the existing system of curtailment priorities for
gas from conventional sources.
(2) Roll in supplemental supplies for curtailment purposes,
but price such supplies incrementally.
(3) Certificate supplemental projects subject to the condi-
tions: (a) that the gas produced be offered to customers in order
of decreasing priority category; and (b) that such gas be priced
incrementally to the ultimate consumer at the burner tip.176
An apparent obstacle to effective implementation of such a plan
or of any federal plan aimed at conservation or allocation through rate
structure reform is that the FPC does not currently have jurisdiction
over pricing of even interstate gas at the burner tip.'77 The viability
of such a pricing and allocation plan would thus depend upon expansion
of the commission's presently recognized jurisdiction or the full coop-
eration of state regulatory commissions. Such practical and legal con-
siderations aside, the suggested plan, if sufficiently sensitive to end use
distinctions not usually recognized by incremental pricing plans, has
some theoretical appeal. This approach recognizes that supplemental
gas cannot be marketed on a noncurtailable basis if the integrity of end
use curtailment policy is to be protected. On the other hand,
it also recognizes that it is not just the industrial consumer who should
be faced with "proper" price signals with regard to the costs of pro-
ducing and transporting expensive supplemental supplies.1 77a Residential
175. As noted earlier, these goals include giving consumers more accurate price sig-
nals, encouraging conservation, and avoiding excess investment in energy facilities.
176. See INCREMENTAL PRICING, supra note 143.
177. Section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act, provides: "The provisions of this chap-
ter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale
in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for do-
mestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural gas companies engaged
in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale
of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such
distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas." 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)
(1970).
177a. Industrial users are generally already aware of the necessity to conserve gas
since many have already felt the squeeze of curtailments. Of the nineteen interstate pipe-
lines affected by the Order Instituting Proceedings, Establishing Procedures and Provid-
ing for Hearings and Conferences to Evaluate the Impact of Natural Gas Shortages of
Interstate Pipeline Companies, issued in Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co., Docket
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 281142
May 19771 NATURAL GAS AND ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE REFORM 1143
and small commercial consumers should also receive accurate price sig-
nals. Thus, rates should not be set for these classes at less than the
average cost of gas; otherwise, they will have no incentive to lower ther-
mostats, add insulation, or take other steps to conserve gas. Under
such a plan, supplemental gas would be made available to existing high
priority users first, charging them at the incremental rate for all vol-
umes of gas taken over a predetermined entitlement to conventional sup-
plies based perhaps on a test year. All supply volumes would be sub-
ject to curtailment, and, as is presently the policy, each curtailment
priority would be completely curtailed as to both conventional and
supplemental supplies before the next highest priority was curtailed at
all. To the extent, however, that any consumer in any noncurtailed
or incompletely curtailed priority category takes more than his adminis-
tratively determined entitlement to conventional supply,7 8 he would
be charged at the incremental rate. In this manner, not even the
Nos. RP76-116 (FPC, July 20, 1976), fourteen reported supply deficiencies in excess
of 25% of firm requirements for November 1976 to March 1977. Projected deficiencies
ranged from 18.99% to 50.98%. These figures are indicative of the significant extent
to which lower priority customers have been and are being curtailed, creating an acute
awareness on their part of the need to use the gas which is available to them in the most
careful and efficient manner possible.
178. The Office of Economics itself recognizes in its report, "[Elntitlement plans
have a number of potential inequities associated with them, inequities which might make
them difficult to administer and result in the emergence of a cumbersome appeals mech-
anism." INCREMENTAL PRICING, supra note 143, at 31. If the plan determines a cus-
tomer's quota of low cost conventional gas on the basis of his consumption patterns in
a previous period, it will penalize those customers who made concerted conservation ef-
forts during that period relative to those who made lesser efforts to conserve. Such a
system also may fail to take account of changes in residences where the new occupants
may require more or less gas than the previous occupants. The authors of the report
recognize that some such inequities could be addressed by making the quota a function
of more than one variable, but also that "Itlhe introduction of complexities of this char-
acter are certain to generate administrative problems of formidable proportions." Id. at
32. The report suggests a number of possible general alternatives, such as creating
separate quota formulae for residential, commercial, and industrial users, or making
quotas a function of average degree days in any given locality. It concludes that quotas,
however they are set, are likely to be a highly controversial issue. Id.
The Office of Economics report also notes that pipelines and distributors are likely
to resist a marketing scheme based on quotas inasmuch as it does not guarantee that
they will be able to sell expensive supplemental supplies. (The same may be said gen-
erally for the reaction of investors in supplemental supply projects.) Consequently, the
report suggests several possible resale plans which would permit a customer to sell its
entitlements or perhaps receive a credit when its consumption was less than its quota.
Regardless of the precise methods selected, it appears that the administrative trans-
action costs of implementing the type of incremental pricing plan proposed in the Office
of Economics report may be considerable. Accordingly, this factor must be given due
weight in evaluation of this type of plan.
highest priority consumers are guaranteed an unlimited supply of in-
expensive gas.
Such a plan treats all customers alike to the extent that it attempts
to match up the cost of developing new gas supplies with those who
actually consume the gas. Furthermore, it more accurately reflects
what is known generally about the nature of consumer demand (but
which is often ignored by rate reforms): not all industrial uses of nat-
ural gas are "low priority" and not all commercial uses or even residen-
tial uses (if apartment buildings with central furnaces are considered)
are "high priority."
The attractiveness of the Office of Economics proposal stems from
its adherence to the traditional goal of ratemaking-the matching of
costs of service with the customers who benefit from that service to
meet the utility's revenue requirements-even though the proposal de-
viates from the traditional average cost method of achieving that goal.
Unlike the more commonly discussed incremental pricing proposals,
this proposal has the potential to avoid the kind of discrimination in-
volved in relying upon untested and probably inaccurate generalizations
which impose the costs of additional supplies only upon selected cus-
tomers. Although the current jurisdictional limits on the FPC and the
administrative complexity previously mentioned present serious diffi-
culties, this rate structure proposal merits further study.
C. End Use Rate Schedules
End use rate schedules would charge different rates to different
end use customers and to distributors with different end use profiles
regardless of the intensity or the volumetric level of their consumption.
Although many of the arguments for and against this type of proposal
are identical to those described in the discussion of rolled-in versus in-
cremental pricing,1 9 a look at the procedural history of this reform and
the issues which relate specifically to end use rate schedules is infor-
mative.
In 1975, the FPC issued a "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking With
Request for Comments" in a rulemaking docket entitled End Use Rate
Schedules.8 ° In it the commission announced that it had under con-
sideration "a proposal to require that natural gas purchased for ultimate
179. See text accompanying notes 143-73 supra.
180. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with Request for Comments, End Use Rate
Schedules, No. RM75-19 (FPC, filed Feb. 20, 1975).
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utilization or consumption in various classes of usage be sold under se-
parate pipeline contracts and rate schedules."'' Of the 273 parties
which responded to the notice, 264 parties-including interstate pipe-
lines, natural gas consumers, trade associations, gas distributors, state
utility commissions, and even two offices of the FPC-filed comments
opposing the proposal.
Postulating that "substantial amounts of natural gas are still being
sold for industrial consumption at rates which understate both the cost
and the value of the gas,"'1 82 the commission found it "apparent" that
simply increasing the cost of natural gas to industrial consumers through
the limited means of altering the demand-commodity relationship,'83
would not sufficiently reduce industrial consumption. Consequently,
it determined that "presently available, presently deliverable natural
gas supplies [should] be dedicated, as a matter of priority,
to residential and commercial needs on an end use basis.' 84  In
short, the commission proposed that a policy decision should be made
that all gas purchased under contracts dated before 1973 be allocated
to residential and commercial consumers and all gas purchased under
contracts dated after 1972 be allocated to industrial customers. Aban-
doning any pretense of basing rates on cost, be they average, marginal,
or incremental, the commission sought to insure that industrial con-
sumers would bear the full costs of all the more recent higher priced
supplies.'88
This approach fails to distinguish between high and low priority
commercial and industrial uses and produces results directly contrary
to the goal of end use curtailment plans-to require conversion to al-
ternate fuels by those consumers for whom it is economically most
feasible."8 6 Under the end use rate proposal, large commercial boilers
which, except for the label, are indistinguishable from low priority in-
181. Id. at 1.
182. Id. at 2.
183. See text accompanying notes 124-42 supra.
184. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with Request for Comments at 2-6, End Use
Rate Schedules, No. RM75-19 (FPC, filed Feb. 20, 1975).
185. The notice also proposed that all fixed and variable costs (other than pur-
chased gas) be determined on a 100% volumetric basis, thus completely eliminating the
demand component of a two-part rate. Moreover, rate schedules for transportation,
storage, and other special services (including LNG and SNG) were proposed to be de-
signed to recover all costs directly attributable to rendition of such services and all other
costs on a volumetric basis. Id. at 4. See text accompanying notes 124-42 supra with
regard to the issue of two-part versus one-part rates.
186. See note 117 supra.
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dustrial boilers and are most easily convertible to alternate fuels, would
be permitted to continue to buy inexpensive gas. On the other hand,
feedstock, process, and plant protection users,18 7 would only be per-
mitted to buy gas at premium rates which absorb the total costs of the
more recent, more expensive supplies, merely because they are labeled
"industrial.' '1
88
Even if end use rate schedules were found to have some general
validity in theory, the Gordian division between industrial and nonin-
dustrial customers proposed by the FPC could result in a significantly
adverse impact upon individual high priority industrial consumers, upon
the cost of their products, and upon the national economy. 8 9 For ex-
ample, to the extent that such premium industrial users would be able
to maintain their level of production, such a proposal could have a
severe inflationary effect. Due to the fact that many such users manu-
facture basic products used as components in other products (such as
many chemical and metallurgical products), this inflationary effect
would probably ripple through wide segments of the economy to the
detriment of all consumers.
187. The commission has repeatedly found these uses to be nonsubstitutable. See
Order No. 533 at 33, Policy with Respect to Certification of Pipeline Transportation
Agreements, No. RM75-25 (FPC, Aug. 28, 1975). See also Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp., No. CP76-279 (FPC, Aug. 18, 1976) (findings and order with regard to pro-
cess use by Burlington Industries); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., No. CP76-
363 (FPC, Aug. 13, 1976) (findings and order with regard to process use by Pine Hall
Brick & Pipe Co.); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., No. CP76-241 (FPC, May
24, 1976) (findings and order with regard to process used by Nabisco, Inc. and Cone
Mills Corp.).
188. The FPC in recent curtailment cases has recognized that curtailment plans
should treat similarly-sized boilers in the same way, be they "commercial" or "indus-
trial." See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., No. RP72-99, Op. No. 778
(FPC, Oct. 8, 1976); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., No. RP71-119, Op. No. 754
(FPC, Feb. 27, 1976).
189. "In sum, the proposed rule making will raise costs for industrial users during
a time of inflation and serious unemployment. . . . The effect on unemployment, while
hard to quantify, cannot be ignored. At a time when economic recovery is of paramount
importance, the postulated benefits of eliminating two-part rates and subsidizing residen-
tial consumption must be examined thoroughly. There is no doubt that gas supplies for
residential consumers must be reserved and protected-over time and not just for the
next few heating seasons. To this end, the rule making is properly oriented. On the
other hand, the blanket inclusion of all industrial users regardless of volume of use, type
of use, availability of alternative energy sources (and their costs), technical considera-
tions, and lack of locational differentiation seem questionable at least." Comments of
the Office of Economics, Federal Power Commission, at 6, June 19, 1975, End Use Rate
Schedules, No. RM75-19 (FPC, filed Feb. 20, 1975), quoted in Helman, A Lawyer
Looks at the Problems of Gas Rate Design, PuB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 11, 1975,
at 68, 69.
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Certain industrial uses, however, cannot feasibly be converted to
alternate fuels. 190 Therefore, the commission's stated objective of re-
ducing industrial consumption of natural gas can be achieved by such
users only through large absolute reductions in fuel or feedstock con-
sumption, not by switching to an alternate fuel. There is a lack of sta-
tistical evidence concerning the degree to which such reductions in con-
sumption can now be achieved without reducing productivity. The
records in many curtailment proceedings before the FPC, however,
establish that: (1) there already has been considerable conservation
in the industrial sector in the face of often severe curtailments,' 91 and
(2) the ability to achieve conservation in many industrial operations,
particularly in process and feedstock uses, is severely limited. Thus,
in many cases, a reduction in natural gas consumption would inevitably
require a reduction in plant output and, perhaps, in employment as
well.192
End use rate structures based on the simplistic distinction between
industrial and nonindustrial uses also discriminate against high priority
industrial users insofar as it requires them to subsidize other high pri-
ority users.' 3 Under such plans, residential and commercial users
would not be paying the full cost of the gas service which they receive,
and the difference would thus have to be make up by all industrial
users, including nonsubstitutable feedstock and process users. Since
there is no justification based on efficient allocation of resources for
having one high priority consumer subsidize another high priority con-
190. See generally, J. Jensen & T. Stauffer, Implications of Natural Gas Consump-
tion for the Implementation of End-Use Priority Programs (1971) (report to the Gen-
eral Counsel, General Motors Corp. from Arthur D. Little, Inc.).
191. See note 177a supra.
192. The commission has recognized the impact of reduced industrial use of natural
gas by high priority industrial consumers on productivity, employment, and the economy
generally: "The practical effect of curtailment of such high priority end uses may very
well be a decrease in the production of these and other essential products and services.
This decrease in production in turn will mean not only shortages but increased inflation
as consumers offer to pay higher prices for the decreasing supply of goods and services
available. Of equal importance is the fact that plant closings and production cutbacks
may result in an increase in the number of workers laid off either temporarily or indef-
initely. We are aware that curtailments of high priority uses pose a serious threat to
the employment of thousands of workers." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at 6-7, No.
RM75-25 (FPC, Apr. 4, 1975).
193. It bears repeating that, under end use curtailment priorities, a natural gas con-
sumer is categorized as a high priority user because, in a free market situation, he would
be willing to pay more for natural gas than a lower priority consumer, since it is less
economically (or technologically) feasible for a high priority user to switch to an alter-
nate fuel.
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sumer, it is anomalous to require industrial feedstock and process users
to subsidize residential and commercial users.1
9 4
End use rate schedules could be designed to draw the price de-
marcation line below Priority Two rather than simply between indus-
trial and nonindustrial customers. Thus, residential, small commercial,
and industrial feedstock, process, and plant protection uses would be
deemed to be receiving the older, less expensive supplies, and all other
consumers would be deemed to be receiving the newer, higher priced
gas. Such a rate structure, however, would also be seriously flawed.
For example, such a structure would fail to address adequately the prob-
lems of growth and conservation among high priority users. By
keeping the price of gas artificially low for such users, an end use rate
structure would encourage growth in their requirements notwith-
standing the natural gas shortage. Such low price could also induce
significant new load attachments to the detriment of existing Priority
Two industrial customers who would, consequently, then be rendered
more vulnerable to curtailment. Eventually, such new attachments
could expose even existing residential and small commercial consumers
to curtailments. 195
Unlike many existing residential and small commercial consumers,
potential new residential and commercial users are not "locked-in" to
the use of natural gas.'96 Since no capital investment has been made
in fuel facilities, they face entirely different economic choices com-
pared to existing gas consumers. 19 Existing high priority industrial
194. It is particularly anomalous to require such high priority industrial users to
subsidize large commercial boiler fuel users.
195. See Initial Decision, Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., No. CP74-316 (FPC,
May 14, 1976).
196. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking With Request for Comments, at 5, End Use
Rate Schedules, No. RM75-19 (FPC, filed Feb. 20, 1975).
197. In view of the continuing decline in gas supply, unrestricted addition of new
high priority load, whether or not through the maintenance of industrially-subsidized
rates for residential and commercial customers, may undermine an end-use curtailment
strategy. Merely because a particular use of natural gas deserves a high priority in a
curtailment scheme, does not necessarily mean that new uses of this type should be
added at the expense of service to existing uses. For example, while an existing residen-
tial or small commercial consumer would be required to incur undue expense to convert
to an alternate fuel if curtailed, there are generally viable alternatives to natural gas for
such consumers at the time of initial installation. Thus, withholding gas from these con-
sumers does not necessarily involve any hardship to them or any added economic cost
for the nation.
New natural gas service to new residential customers should not be added at the
cost of deepening curtailments, especially to the economic producing sectors of the na-
tion's economy, such as the industrial process and feedstock users. Such curtailments
would force these existing high-priority consumers either (1) to substitute enormous
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customers who may have no technically or economically feasible choice
as to what energy source they can use should not be forced to subsidize
potential new high priority residential and small commercial consumers
who could choose at the outset to utilize an alternate source of energy.
By the same token, existing high priority industrial process and feed-
stock uses which have been classified just below existing residential and
small commercial uses for curtailment purposes, should not be made
more vulnerable to curtailment by the designing of rates for residential
and small commercial customers which stimulate even higher use
among those classes. 198
volumes of propane for the natural gas curtailed, thereby competing with essential agri-
cultural and rural uses for the extremely limited supply of propane, or (2) to scrap their
existing equipment and replace it entirely with completely new equipment designed to
burn another fuel, if the technology for such equipment has been developed. The first
option would place an intolerable burden on the limited supply of propane. The second
option would require the unnecessary expenditure of enormous sums of capital, thereby
imposing even greater burdens on the already overburdened capital markets.
Furthermore, a policy which allows new load additions while existing high priority
customers suffer increasing curtailments raises serious equitable problems. Even without
growth, curtailment-the taking away of gas from existing customers who have a con-
tractual claim to it-runs afoul of traditional legal and equitable principles. It can
hardly be considered fair to deny an existing high priority customer gas it is contrac-
tually entitled to while giving that gas (whether or not at discount prices) to a new cus-
tomer who has neither any legal nor equitable entitlement to it. The unfairness of at-
taching new customers without a showing of truly unique needs becomes particularly ap-
parent when it is considered that an existing pipeline customer seeking extraordinary re-
lief from curtailment must satisfy a very rigorous burden of proof before he is permitted
to secure volumes of gas to which he would be entitled but for curtailment. Texas East-
ern Transmission Corp., No. RP74-39-3, Op. No. 716 (FPC, Dec. 1-6, 1974), aff'd sub
nom. United States Steel Corp v. FPC, 533 F.2d 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Even in
taking away a customer's gas at the expiration of his contract, a pipeline acts unfairly
if it cuts off gas to a user who has built his business around it in order to give it to
a new user who never had any right or claim to it and who could install alternate fuel
facilities. Statutory abandonment procedures were designed to protect existing users
from just such actions. See Initial Decision, Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., No.
CP74-299 (FPC, Apr. 22, 1976).
It is clear that many new gas customers could use other sources such as oil or elec-
tricity, and that these proposed new high priority customers are, by their nature, cus-
tomers which, once added to a natural gas system, cannot be curtailed without creating
severe hardships. Furthermore, in light of projected shortages and deepening curtail-
ments, the addition of such new customers would eventually mean curtailment of existing
high-priority customers without alternate fuel capability. See BUREAU OF NATURAL GAS,
FPC, STAFF REPORT: A REALISTIC VIEw OF U.S. NATURAL GAS SUPPLY (1974). Ac-
cordingly, an effective energy policy must place strict limitations on market expansion
policies of pipelines and gas distribution companies. See Northern Natural Gas Co., No.
CP75-333, Op. No. 773 (FPC, Aug. 13, 1976). For example, before new load is at-
tached to a system, it should be demonstrated that there are no feasible alternative fuels,
no feasible alternate sources of gas, and adequate future supplies to protect high-priority
customers.
198. The imposition of restrictions or moratoria on additions of new customers is
It may be noted further that artificially low nonindustrial rates may
be illusory in the sense that they are relatively shortlived for residential
and small commercial users. If all lower priority industrial consump-
tion is priced out of the natural gas market, as is apparently intended
by advocates of end use schedules, the full weight of high industrial
prices will fall first on the smaller group of industrial users who cannot
convert to alternate fuels. Such process, feedstock, and plant protec-
tion users will then be faced with the choice of either passing the in-
creased costs on to their customers in the form of higher product prices
or reducing, perhaps eliminating entirely, production of products which
require natural gas. Some of these users will be unable to overcome
the competitive disadvantage resulting from the high costs and will be
forced to shut down, leaving an even smaller pool of high priority in-
dustrial customers to share the costs of the high priced gas. At the
point at which all industrial use is priced out of the market, due to the
requirement that it absorb the full cost of new gas supplies, resi-
dential and commercial users will experience a cataclysmic increase in
the cost of their supply inasmuch as they will have to bear immediately
the much higher average cost of all gas supplies. In short, when there
are no longer any industrial users left in the market to subsidize resi-
dential and commercial consumers, those consumers' rates will jump
dramatically,199 with potentially serious social and economic results..2 11
Inasmuch as end use rate reforms, then, also deviate from cost
of service principles and are not supported by evidence which might
justify unequal treatment for equal service, the discrimination which re-
sults would appear to be "undue."
desirable at least for a period of time during which a comprehensive study of load
growth might be undertaken with a view toward developing a coherent growth policy
which will not undermine curtailment. See generally Rattner, Gas Utilities Added
341,000 Customers Despite Warnings, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1977, at 39, col. 1. Such
restrictions would also dampen the effects of end-use rate schedules in pricing industrial
users out of the market as they became forced to subsidize an increasing pool of residen-
tial and commercial consumers.
199. Such development of events might profitably be compared with the impact pro-
duced by average cost pricing, under which there is a dampening of price fluctuations
and all customers are permitted to absorb the higher cost of new gas supplies gradually
over time in manageable small increments, adjusting to absorb minor increases in the
cost of gas service each year. With only 8% of the present national gas supply being
replaced each year with high priced supplemental supplies, it is unlikely that consumers
will be faced with the hardship of being required to cope with rapid and substantial rate
increases. See Consumers Power Company SNG Plan Proceedings (FEA, Nov. 26,
1976) (testimony of Jann W. Carpenter on behalf of General Motors Corp., at 9).
200. It bears emphasis at this point that this article's rejection of those rate design
reforms which have suggested utilization of marginal or incremental cost pricing does
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D. More Effective Alternatives for Allocating Natural Gas
In sum, the most commonly suggested rate structure reforms for
the natural gas industry propose that rates be designed to impose
higher gas prices upon "lower priority" consumers, while charging
"higher priority" consumers prices below the average cost of the total
gas supply. Whether termed "one-part rates," "incremental pricing,"
or "end use rate schedules," these proposals deviate significantly from
traditional ratemaking principles and disrupt any rational approach to
gas allocation.
The paramount objectives of efficient allocation of scarce natural
gas resources, as well as encouragement of conservation, can and
should be accomplished without myopic alteration of traditional rate-
making goals and methods. The most effective action to reduce the
supply-demand gap in the natural gas industry would be to remove
from federal regulation the rates at which producers of new supplies
not reflect rejection of some of the legitimate ratemaking goals which advocates of these
theories seek to serve. The basic policy inherent in marginal and incremental pricing
theories (referred to synonymously for purposes of the immediate discussion) is rooted
in classic microeconomic theory: price should equal marginal cost in order to yield an
optimal allocation of resources. This is achieved through providing the consumer with
a price signal of the cost to the economy of any given-product so that he can rationally
decide whether to spend his resources for that product or save them for some other use.
The difficulty with most marginal pricing schemes, as they are suggested for the gas in-
dustry, is that they seriously compromise the theory, fall short of the stated goal, and
create troublesome side effects as well. See, e.g., Southern Natural Gas Co., No. RP75-
84 (FPC) in which one party, Atlanta Gas Light Company, recommended marginal cost
pricing and a negative demand charge as a means of bringing pipeline revenues
down to the allowable cost of service. See also Furbush, Rate Design Problems: A
Lawyer's Point of View, PUB. UTis. FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 11, 1975, at 66-67. "mhe
use of price to distribute or redistribute income violates the basic rationale for the use
of marginal pricing." Id.
The goal of confronting consumers of natural gas with accurate price signals is rec-
ognized in this article to be of great importance. The commonly suggested reforms,
however, seek only to confront selected consumers with such signals, notwithstanding the
economic facts that (1) all users of service in an integrated system are to some degree
marginal users of the incremental commodity available to the system, and (2) all mar-
ginal users in the system must be confronted with the true cost of their consumption
if incremental pricing is to be effective. See Northern Ill. Gas Co. SNG Plant Proceed-
ing (FEA, filed Nov. 5, 1976) (testimony of Jann W. Carpenter op behalf of General
Motors Corp, at 17); El Paso Alaska Co., Docket Nos. CP75-96 (FPC, Dec. 3, 1976)
(Statement of Sierra Club, at 5); Frazier, Marginal Cost Pricing for Gas Service:
Theory and Application, in FPC National Gas Survey Technical Advisory Task Force,
Final Report on Transmission, Distribution & Storage: Rate Design, at 6 (1976) (draft
chapter). For a discussion of marginal and incremental cost electric rates, see notes
10-64, 69-84 & accompanying text supra.
of natural gas can sell this gas to interstate pipelines.2 1 1 Deregulation
would allow the current artifically depressed price of natural gas to rise
to the level where consumers would receive more accurate price signals
concerning the costs of producing and transporting new supplies. The
market would likewise receive more realistic feedback as to what amount
of economic resources should be devoted to the development of new
supplies, given that the level of demand is no longer inflated by artifically
low prices. As the price of natural gas rose to a level more reflective of
its premium fuel and feedstock characteristics, only those consumers for
whom gas is the only feasible alternative would continue to buy it. Those
consumers whose demand for gas in the past had been dictated only by
its relatively lower price would be impelled to convert to other, non-
premium fuels. Of course, deregulation, at least at the wellhead, would
require action by the Congress, but recent legislative proposals have been
defeated.2 °2 Moreover, to be completely effective, theoretically speak-
ing, deregulation would have to extend not only to the price at which
producers sell natural gas at the wellhead, but also to the price at which
gas is sold to the ultimate consumer at the burner tip. However, even
if the price of gas is not deregulated, the FPC's present curtailment
policy based on end use is a more effective means to direct the alloca-
tion of available gas supplies. Moreover, if it is determined that certain
low priority end uses, such as boiler fuel uses, are undesirable, the com-
mission can exercise its authority to commence hearings for abandon-
ment of such service,20 3 or Congress can prohibit it outright.20 4 Such
methods are more appropriate and more effective in achieving the stated
efficiency and allocation objectives than measures which propose to
achieve them through abandonment of the most fundamental principle
of ratemaking: each customer's rates should reflect the utility's cost
of serving it. If that principle is adhered to, consumers will receive price
signals comparable to those in the unregulated market, and thereby ad-
just their consumption accordingly. One-part rates, incremental pricing,
201. See Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Nat-
ural Gas Producers, 86 HARv. L. REv. 941 (1973); The Gas Utility Executives' Forum:
Deregulation, the Ultimate Answer? PUB. UnLS. FoRTNIGHrLY, Oct. 21, 1976, at 83-
87; The Natural Gas Executives' Forum, PUB. UTILS. FoRTNIGHTLY, Oct. 24, 1974, at
68-78.
202. See, e.g., H.R. 9464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3422, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); S. 2310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). But see Emergency Natural Gas Act
of 1977 under which natural gas is deregulated to the extent of emergency 180-day pur-
chases by interstate pipelines. Pub. L. 95-2 (Feb. 2, 1977).
203. See Natural Gas Act § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1970).
204. See, e.g., S. 3422, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 9464, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976); H.R. 10480, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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and end use schedules not only represent rejection of cost as the funda-
mental principle of ratemaking, but also fail to achieve their intended
goal of efficiently allocating natural gas. Other more direct methods
of allocation are available that do not require discriminatory pricing.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
The rate structure reforms discussed in this article are illustrative
of a significant shift in ratemaking philosophy. Historically, regulatory
commissions were established to protect consumers from the potential
excesses of monopoly pricing.20 5 This role has broadened consider-
ably; commissions now focus not only on the overall rate level sought
by utilities, but also on the specific rate structure they employ to collect
that revenue.2 °6 The new ratemaking philosophy seeks to use rate
structure as a vehicle to achieve varied social policy goals. While we
affirm the importance of those broader objectives, we believe it is
highly questionable whether changes in utility rate structures can effec-
tively accomplish such goals; indeed, many of these goals may be more
efficiently attained through alternate means.
Moreover, as we have seen, such changes in rate structure often
conflict with the traditional goal of matching the costs incurred by the
utility to those customers who impose them. Though most new rate
structure reforms are purportedly "cost based," cost is defined in a new
way. Rather than focusing on the total cost actually incurred by the
utility, many rate structure reforms focus only on the utility's marginal
or incremental costs. While there may be some theoretical validity for
defining cost in this way, it is unrealistic to apply these definitions in
a regulated market where revenue requirements are based on average
cost and where competing substitutable goods are not priced at their
marginal or incremental cost. A utility's revenue requirement is based
on its total cost of service, not merely on the cost of supplying its last
unit of output. Thus, a cost standard which results in all customers
being charged a price for all units of consumption equal to the utility's
cost of producing only the last unit of output, will, in an era of rising
costs, result in excess revenue for the utility.
As has been shown, rate structure reforms based on marginal and
incremental cost propose to deal with this problem in either of two ways:
(1) in the electric industry, an elaborate system for rebating excess
205. See MacDonald v. FPC, 505 F.2d 355, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
206. See generally Galligan, Rate Design Objectives and Realities, PuB. UTM.S.
FORTNiowHmY, May 6, 1976, at 31.
revenue must be developed; (2) in the gas industry, the new cost de-
finition is selectively applied only to "lower priority" (mainly indus-
trial) customers. In either case, the end result of these adjustments
is emasculation of the economic theories on which they are based, eco-
nomic and perhaps legal discrimination against some customers, and a
form of taxation through ratemaking that results in wide deviations
from cost based rates for the sake of various social welfare or energy
related policy goals.
Although consideration of noncost factors enters into the rate-
making process, this article has expressed serious doubt as to whether
such factors should constitute the foundation of utility rates, particularly
when they do not serve any energy related goal. However, even as-
suming that it is within the regulatory commission's authority to deviate
from cost based rates to achieve social welfare or energy related goals,
it appears that the reforms discussed in this article fail to achieve their
stated goal and can be accomplished more efficiently through other
means. More specifically:
A. The stated goal of marginal cost pricing of electricity is the eco-
nomic efficiency achieved when rates are set equal to marginal costs.
As has been demonstrated, however, not all consumers can pay a rate
equal to marginal cost without, in most cases, the utility collecting wind-
fall profits to which it is not legally entitled. The theory of marginal
cost pricing must, therefore, be severely compromised in actual practice
in order to prevent such an overcollection of revenue (or undercollec-
tion) necessitating either major adjustments to true marginal pricing or
selective application of marginal pricing among customers. Time-of-
day and other peak load pricing devices, while usually associated with
marginal cost pricing, can just as easily be employed with average cost
pricing (using a future test year to reflect rising costs) and thus track
more accurately the actual cost to the utility of serving its customers. °7
B. Lifeline rates are intended to assist low income consumers by
subsidizing their usage of a minimum quantity of energy. Such rates,
however, fail to aid all low income consumers, and it is likely, under
such a theory, that some low income users will be forced to subsidize
some higher income users. The social welfare goal of subsidizing sub-
sistence usage of energy by lower income consumers could be achieved
more directly and more effectively through development of, for
example, an energy stamp program. If a legislative judgment were
207. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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made that such subsidization is a desirable measure warranting the ap-
propriation of tax revenues, a program of this kind could assure that
low cost subsistence-level energy-gas, electric, coal, or whatever form
of energy that was used-would be provided to those consumers in
need of this assistance.
C. Conservation is the intended goal of inverted and flat energy
rates; however, if conservation results in decreasing only the total amount
of energy consumed without reducing system peak demand, under-utili-
zation of the utility's facilities will result. By focusing only on energy
consumption rather than peak demand, such rates often result in earnings
erosion and provide an incentive for additional consumption in the early
blocks of the rate. As a result, utilities are likely to return sooner for
additional rate increases. Consumers may thus be rewarded for their
conservation efforts with higher rates.20 8
D. The stated goals of one-part (100 percent volumetric) rates, in-
cremental pricing of supplemental supplies, and end-use rate schedules
are (1) to confront consumers with accurate price signals, (2) to pro-
mote the efficient allocation of scarce natural gas resources, and (3)
to discourage consumption of natural gas in uses which are deemed to
be "inferior." While all three of these intended goals are important,
these rate structure reforms do not accomplish them. On the contrary,
such rate structures can potentially undermine important curtailment
policies and discourage financing for supplemental gas supply projects;
moreover, severe economic dislocation can result from rapid and sub-
stantial price increases to consumers who utilize natural gas in uses for
which there is no economically-or technically-feasible alternative.
Like its counterpart proposed in the design of electricity rates, incre-
mental pricing of supplemental gas supplies would also necessarily result
in overcollection of revenue if applied uniformly to all customers. To
avoid this result, and to discourage "low priority" usage of gas, the
commonly suggested incremental pricing scheme deviates from the
pure economic theory and imposes incremental prices only on selected
customers. Similarly, end-use rate schedules suffer from the same in-
firmities. In addition, by basing rates on end-use curtailment prin-
208. Average cost rates, on the other hand, if calculated to reflect accurately a cus-
tomer's actual share of the utility's fixed and variable costs (particularly if combined
with time-of-day or other peak pricing rates), provide the customer with realistic price
signals, thus encouraging conservation at the levels required. Moreover, if responsibility
for fixed costs is properly assigned to all customers in the early blocks (or by means of
a fixed monthly charge), desired conservation will not yield the undesirable conse-
quences of revenue losses and subsequently even higher rates.
ciples, they do violence to those principles and, at the same time,
charge higher prices for relatively inferior service. In contrast with
these reforms, (1) rolling in the costs of new gas supplies allows con-
sumers (all of whom benefit from such new, more expensive supplies)
to adjust gradually to the higher average costs, while confronting them
with price signals which accurately reflect the costs incurred in serving
them; (2) rational curtailment policies, limitations on additions of new
load, and, ultimately, deregulation will directly yield more efficient al-
location of scarce resources to those uses which value it most highly;
and (3) legislation to prohibit directly, for example, use of natural gas
in large industrial boilers or for the generation of electricity will more
effectively eliminate such wasteful usage of this premium fuel.
In short, the reforms examined in this article for the most part fail
to achieve the broad social policy goals which they are intended to ad-
vance, and are at odds with the traditional ratemaking goal of matching
consumers' rates with the costs incurred by the utility in serving them.
The traditional goals are better served by rates based on average cost,
and the broader social objectives are better served through such rates
in conjunction with legislative and administrative programs which are
narrowly drawn to advance such aims more directly and effectively.
Using a utility's actual costs of service as a basis for setting rates
enables a reasonably objective cost standard to be employed. In the
absence of such a standard, the power to establish just and reasonable
rates is, in effect, transformed into the power to tax. Rates thus be-
come an instrument of social policy to redistribute responsibility for the
costs of producing energy in order to accomplish certain energy policy
goals and to redistribute wealth.
Regulatory commissions usually are not vested with, nor ac-
customed to, an explicit power to tax. Furthermore, they have to date
been subject to judicial review under only the most deferential of stand-
ards. Due to the popular reaction against rising utility rates, most com-
missons are especially vulnerable to political pressure. Thus, there is
a great temptation to embrace certain rate structure reforms simply be-
cause they have a revenue impact that is politically acceptable to a ma-
jority of the regulators' constituents, without subjecting such reforms
to sufficiently rigorous examination. To the extent these reforms do
not achieve their intended goals, the rates which result may be unduly
discriminatory.
The current shift in ratemaking philosophy towards a taxation
approach results in rates based primarily on subjective consider-
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ations. As a former Federal Power Commissioner has noted, such an
approach moves ratemaking "into a shadow land where certainty and
predictability simply cannot exist."2" 9  Relatively speaking, cost based
rates avoid such excursions because they are "objective, definable and
predictable." This article supports the principle that rates should be
cost based. It suggests, however, that, if the trend toward taxation
through ratemaking is to continue, the following approach to rate-
making should be applied: (1) the underlying assumptions of any rate
structure reform must be made explicit; (2) the validity of these as-
sumptions must be supported by record evidence; and (3) the reform
must actually be evaluated in terms of its capacity to achieve effectively
its intended goals. Only then will the enormously expanded discretion
of regulatory commissioners at least be capable of meaningful judicial
review.
209. The apprehension felt by some at the prospect of transforming economic regu-
lation into a wholly subjective process, in which cost principles are stretched and
squeezed in order to fit them into the Procrustean bed of the social policy of the mo-
ment, has been articulated recently as follows: "By distortion of cost allocations, by the
use of social values instead of economic criteria, it is certainly conceivable that utility
rates can serve to effect a massive redistribution of dollars-not just between the indus-
trial sector and the residential sector, but between different economic strata as well.
"If these changes are to come, it seems to me that they should come forthrightly
through legislative or constitutional mandate: I am persuaded that the regulatory system
has no business whatsoever in attempting to make and implement social judgments of
the magnitude we are discussing.
"At the heart of my concern lies a nagging uneasiness that economic regulation is
on the threshold of becoming something entirely different. I hold the view that rate
cases, and certificate cases, should be decided by objective, definable, predictable stand-
ards. That, in short, administrative law should be governed by the rule of laws and
not by the rule of man. When we introduce social considerations into the decisional
process, we move from the objective to the subjective: when we begin to use utility rates
to effect a redistribution of wealth, we have moved into a shadow land where certainty
and predictability simply cannot exist." Moody, Natural Gas Pricing and Rate Design
Issues, in Proceedings of the 1976 Symposium on Rate Design Problems of Regulated
Industries 333 (Feb. 22-25, 1976).
[Editor's Note: This article went to press prior to the presentation of the President's
'National Energy Plan' in late April 1977.]

